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In Defense of Civil Redress:
The Domestic Enforcement of
Human Rights Norms in the Context of the
Proposed Hague Judgments Convention
Beth Van Schaack*
Unless recovery is allowed in each instance where there has been a viola-
tion of a right, the violations will be repeated with impunity, and that
which is wrong will come to be regarded as something right. Unless it
is faced and dealt with, wrong will have the same stature as right.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Delegations from forty-five countries are in the process of drafting the
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commer-
cial Matters ("the Hague Convention") under the auspices of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law.2 The Hague Convention seeks to
* Attorney-at-law, Morrison & Foerster, LLP, Palo Alto, Cal. and Acting Executive Director, The Cen-
ter for Justice & Accountability, San Francisco, Cal. B.A., Stanford University, 1991; J.D., Yale Univer-
sity, 1997. I am indebted to Paul Dubinsky Ryan Goodman, Christopher Hall, Derek Jinks, Friedrich
Juenger, David Sloss, and Beth Stephens for their comments on this Article. I also wish to express my
gratitude to the editors of the Harvard Interntional Law Journal, with special thanks to Bill Burke-White,
Cristin Doyle, and David Mascari.
1 J.D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW § 1.01, at 2 (rev. ed. 1988).
2. The Hague Conference on Private International Law ("the Hague Conference") is an intergovern-
mental organization whose purpose is "to work for the progressive unification of the rules of private
international law." Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, opened for signature July
15, 1955, art. 1, 15 U.S.T. 2228, 2228, 220 U.N.T.S. 121, 121. The Hague Conference negotiates and
drafts multilateral treaties in various fields of private international law, such as international judicial and
administrative cooperation and conflict of laws for contracts and torts. The Secretariat conducts prepara-
tory research, and Special Commissions composed of governmental experts compile draft conventions.
The drafts are then discussed and adopted at a Plenary Session of the Hague Conference, a diplomatic
conference held every four years. The following forty-seven states are members of the Hague Conference:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg,
Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slo-
venia, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay,
and Venezuela. See http:/lwww.hcch.net/e/memberslmembers.html (last updated Sept. 27, 2000).
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establish a foundation for a worldwide regime for the free enforcement of
civil judgments in exchange for the rigid regulation of assertions of personal
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the proposed Hague Convention will oblige signa-
tories to prohibit the exercise of certain bases of personal jurisdiction and
will require the enforcement of only those judgments obtained through the
application of a mandatory basis of jurisdiction. Other bases of jurisdiction
may be allowed, but the enforcement of any resultant judgment would be
discretionary.
The current deliberations raise high stakes for parties engaged in litiga-
tion seeking to enforce international human rights, international humani-
tarian law, and international criminal law through civil actions in domestic
courts. Civil actions initiated by victims or the families of victims of human
rights violations likely fall under the Hague Convention's proposed
definition of "civil and commercial matters." 3 This would include suits
brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA),4 the Torture Victim Pro-
tection Act (TVPA),5 the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA),6 and the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunity Act (FSIA)7 in the United States. Similarly, the ability of
victims of human rights abuses to bring claims for reparations in connection
with criminal trials, as is allowed in many civil law jurisdictions, will also
be affected by the Hague Convention's proposed provisions. If such criminal
cases involve an extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction, companion civil
suits may be prohibited by the proposed Hague Convention's jurisdictional
regime.
3. According to Article 1, the Hague Convention will apply to civil and commercial matters, except
matters concerning the civil status and legal capacity of natural persons, maintenance obligations, mat-
rimonial property regimes, wills and succession, insolvency and analogous proceedings, social security,
arbitration proceedings, and admiralty or maritime matters. HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW,
PRELIMINARY DRAsT CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COM-
MERCIAL MATTERS, art. 1 (Oct. 30, 1999), available at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e. html
[hereinafter OCTOBER DRAFr CONVENTION) (visited on Nov. 16, 2000).
4. The Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994) [hereinafter ATCA], provides that federal
courts may entertain "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States." Cases have been brought under the ATCA involving claims of
genocide, torture, summary execution, disappearance, arbitrary detention, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes. See BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN
U.S. COURTS 5 (1996). The plaintiff must be an alien and the defendant may be a U.S. or a foreign citi-
zen. See ia at 6.
5. The Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Star. 73 (1992) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 note (1994)) [hereinafter TVPA), creates a federal cause of action specifically for torture
and summary execution committed anywhere in the world. Both the plaintiff and the defendant may be
U.S. or foreign citizens, as long as the defendant acted under color of law of a foreign nation. See STE-
PHENS & RATNER, supra note 4, at 6.
6. The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990 provides that
[a~ny national of the U.S. injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of in-
ternational terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate
district court of the United States and shall recover threefold damages he or she sustains and the cost
of the suit, including attorney's fees.
18 U.S.C. § 2333 (1994).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1994).
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This Article addresses the impact the proposed Hague Convention will
have on these lawsuits. The Article begins with a brief survey of the way in
which such litigation proceeds in domestic courts in both civil and common
law jurisdictions; examines the exercise of jurisdiction in these suits with
reference to exemplary cases; and then recounts the genesis of the proposed
Hague Convention and the impact it could have on civil human rights cases
if the drafters do not include language exempting such litigation from the
proposed jurisdictional regime. The Article demonstrates that if the Hague
Convention is adopted without a special provision protecting human rights
litigation, it could severely hamper one of the most innovative developments
in international law and unduly interfere with present and future efforts by
states to comply with duties under international treaty and customary law.
The Article argues that the Hague Convention must not foreclose civil cases
based on human rights violations, particularly given the importance to vic-
tims of civil redress in domestic courts and the paucity of legal institutions
in which victims of human rights abuses can seek civil redress from respon-
sible individuals. Finally, the Article suggests adjustments to the draft under
consideration and presents a proposal for interpretation that will disarm
these threats, leave intact existing avenues for the civil redress of human
rights violations, and enhance the enforcement of international norms in
national courts.8
II. HuMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN DOMESTIC COURTS
In the last two decades, survivors of human rights abuses have sought to
enforce human rights norms through litigation in national courts, in part
because of the lack of effective and accessible enforcement regimes at the
international level. This general phenomenon has taken different forms in
common law and civil law systems. In civil law countries, actions to enforce
international human rights norms generally proceed as criminal suits prose-
cuted by representatives of the state. In such systems, the victims of the
crimes in question may either commence or join these criminal suits as par-
ties civiles. The primary remedy obtained is the punishment of the defendant,
but victims may also seek civil reparations in connection with the criminal
trial. In contrast, in the United States, actions to enforce international hu-
8. For additional information about previous drafts and the surrounding debates, see generally COALI-
TION ON JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, POSITION PAPER ON DRAFT ARTICLE 20(4)
OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND THE EFFECTS OF JUDGMENTS IN
CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MArERS (1999) [hereinafter COALITION ON JURISDICTION AND ENFORCE-
MENT OF JUDGMENTS]; AMNESTY INT'L, JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS: ENSURING EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT
ABROAD OF COURT DECISIONS CONCERNING REPARATIONS (1999); LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN
RIGHTs, DRAFT CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS (1999);
INT'L ASS'N OF DEMOCRATIC LAWYERS, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, PROPOSALS OF THE
HAGUE CONFERENCE AND THEIR EFFECT ON EFFORTS To ENFORCE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
THROUGH ADJUDICATION (Working Document No. 117, Nov. 13, 1998) [hereinafter Working Docu-
ment No. 117].
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man rights norms have taken the form of civil suits initiated by the victims
themselves or their representatives. The challenged acts are pleaded by the
plaintiffs as torts, and the remedies are compensatory and, potentially, ex-
emplary damages. 9 This Part provides an overview of the way in which cases
seeking to enforce international human rights norms have proceeded in do-
mestic courts in these two systems with reference to exemplary cases and the
jurisdictional bases under which such cases are brought.
A. Cases Seeking to Enforce International Human Rights in
Civil Law Jurisdictions
The last two decades have witnessed a resurgence in prosecutions of inter-
national crimes throughout Europe at a rate not seen since immediately fol-
lowing the Second World War. Officials in civil law states are increasingly
prosecuting individuals for extraterritorial violations of international law.
Many of these cases involve the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction-ei-
ther through the universality or passive personality principles--over the
defendant. 10 Prosecutions arising out of conflicts in Latin America, Europe,
and Africa have been commenced in states such as Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Senegal, and Switzerland
against individuals who are alleged to have committed international crimes
in other states."
9. As is commonly understood, a "tort" represents "a civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained,
usu~ally] in the form of damages." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1496 (7th ed. 1999). In contrast, a "crime"
is considered a "social harm that the law makes punishable," and thus the state is charged with institut-
ing proceedings against the accused in order to satisfy public justice. Id. at 377. Some human rights
abuses, such as torture, manifest a dual character as both crimes and torts because they harm individual
victims as well as society as a whole. See, e.g., AI-Adsani v. Gov't of Kuwait, 107 I.L.R. 536, 540 (Eng.
C.A. 1996) ("In international law, torture is a violation of a fundamental human right, it is a crime and a
tort for which the victim should be compensated.").
10. International law contains established principles for determining when a state may exercise juris-
diction over international offenses, particularly when those offenses also affect other states (e.g., when a
state seeks to adjudicate acts committed extraterritorially). According to general international law, states
may act with respect to a person accused of committing a crime on the basis of one of five jurisdictional
principles. The "territoriality principle" applies when an offense occurs within the territory of the prose-
cuting state. The "nationality principle" permits jurisdiction when the offender is a national or resident
of the prosecuting state. The "protective principle" permits the exercise of jurisdiction where an extrater-
ritorial act threatens interests that are vital to the integrity of the prosecuting state. The "passive person-
ality principle" permits jurisdiction where the victim is a national of the prosecuting state. And finally,
the 'universality principle" allows all states to prosecute perpetrators of certain violations of international
law regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or the place of commis-
sion. Contemporary cases seeking to enforce human rights norms may be brought on the basis of all five
jurisdictional bases, although cases brought on the basis of either passive personality or universal jurisdic-
tion are increasingly prevalent. See generally R ESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES pt. IV, introductory note (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS]; Harvard Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 439
(1935); IAN BROWNUE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 305-09 (5th ed. Clarendon Press,
1998); Kenneth Randall, UniversalJurisdiction Under International Law, 66 Tex. L. REv. 785,786 (1988).
11. For summaries of these cases, see REDRESS TRUST, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN EUROPE: CRIMI-
NAL PROSECUTIONS IN EUROPE SINCE 1990 FOR WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, AND
GENOCIDE 16-17 (1999); AMNESTY INT'L, THE PINOCHET CASE: UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AND THE
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Additionally, many countries have enacted domestic statutes specifically
providing for the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over grave interna-
tional crimes.12 For example, Belgium has adopted legislation specifically
enabling courts to prosecute violators of the Geneva Conventions and their
Protocols. 13 In February 1999, the Belgian parliament extended the princi-
ple of universal jurisdiction to genocide and crimes against humanity.14
Likewise, the French Code de Procddure Pdnale codifies a form of passive per-
sonality jurisdiction by allowing for the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion when the victim is a French national. 15 A number of Latin American
states, in nations such as Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Uru-
guay, allow for the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction where treaties so
provide. 16
Many civil law jurisdictions provide for some form of intervention by the
injured party in criminal proceedings. 17 In such systems, the injured party
can initiate a criminal proceeding where a prosecutor fails to act or in some
cases can join a civil claim (action civile) to the criminal proceedings in order
to claim compensation.' 8 When the victim constitutes himself as a partie
ABSENCE OF IMMUNITY FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 1-2 (1999).
12 For a comprehensive compendium and analysis of these statutes, see generally MARC WELLER &
WILLIAM BURKE-WHITE, No PLACE TO HIDE: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EXERCISE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE ch. 2 (forthcoming 2000).
13. See Loi du 16 juin 1993 relative B la repression des infractions graves aux Conventions internation-
ales de Gen~ve du 12 aoft 1949 et aux Protocoles I et II du 8 juin 1977, additionnels 4 ces Conventions,
Moniteur Belge, Aug. 5, 1993, p. 17751 (Belg.).
14. See Loi du 10 f6vrier 1999 relative i la rdpression des violations graves du droit international hu-
manitaire, Monireur Belge, Mar. 23, 1999, p. 9286 (BeIg.). Similarly, Austrian law identifies offenses
that can be prosecuted in Austrian courts even though they were committed abroad. § 64 Abs 1 STRA-
GESETZEUCH [StGB] [Penal Code]. Danish law establishes jurisdiction over certain acts of violence or
over cases in which another nation has requested the extradition of the person, extradition has been re-
fused, and the alleged behavior is a crime under Danish law. BORGERLIG STRAFFELOVEN, art. 8, translated
n GiTTE H0YER, ET AL., THE DANISH CRIMINAL CODE (1997). See generally Marianne Holdgaard Bukh,
Promrutton before Danish Courts of Foreigners Suspected of Serious Violations of Human Rights or Humanitarian
Law, 6 EUR. REV. PUB. L. 339 (1994). German law allows for the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction
over certain international crimes, over crimes involving German victims, or pursuant to international
treaties. §§ 6-7 STRAFGESErZBUCH [StGB] [Penal Code].
15. CODE DE PROC9DURE PtNALE [C. PR. PaN.] art. 689-1 [Penal Code] (1988) ("Any foreigner who,
outside the territory of the Republic, commits a felony, either as perpetrator, or as accomplice, may be
prosecuted and tried according to French law, when the victim of this felony is of French nationality.")
translaed in THE FRENCH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Gerald L. Kock & Richard S. Frase trans.,
rev. ed.) (1988); -ee also Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention
(France), Committee Against Torture, at 17-18, U.N. Doc. CATIC/17/Add.18 (1997).
16. See C6DiGO PENAL MILITAR [C.P.M.] art. 7 (Braz.); C6DiGo PENAL [C.P.] arts. 10-11 (El Sal.);
C6DiGO PENAL [C.P.] art. 5(5) (Guat.); C6DIGO PENAL PARA EL DISTRITO FEDERAL [C.P.D.E] art. 6
(Mex.); C6DIGO PENAL [C.P.] art. 10(7) (Uru.).
17. See generally J.A. Jolowicz, Procedural Questions, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COM-
PARATIVE LAW, pr. II, ch. 13, at 3-15 (Andr6 Tunc ed., 1986) (comparing the operation of thepartie civile
system in various civil law countries); Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American
Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CAL. L. REv.
542, 613 (1990) (explaining that the discretion of a French prosecutor is limited by the rights of crime
victims to file charges directly with a police or correctional court, or with an examining magistrate).
18. See, eg., CoNSTITuCI6N [C.E.] art. 125 (Spain); LEY DE ENJUICIAMIENTO CRIMINAL [L.E.CRIM.]
arts. 101, 270 (Spain); CODE DE PROCEDURE PANALE [C. PR. PEN.] art. 87 (Fr.) (providing that a civil
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civile, he may be empowered to act as a co-prosecutor and, as such, receives a
number of procedural advantages, such as the right to employ the full inves-
tigatory facilities of the state, which would be unavailable to him in a
strictly civil proceeding. 19 When the victim constitutes himself as a partie
civile, he is no longer considered a witness and thus cannot be examined
without being offered counsel. 20 Further, a partie civile can appeal the deci-
sion of the juge d'instruction and the court. 21
In asserting the role ofpartie civile, the victim can obtain relief, by way of
reparation or restitution, within the context of a criminal trial.2 2 Once a civil
judgment is issued, it can be executed wherever the defendant's assets are
found under general principles governing the enforcement of foreign judg-
ments or any operative enforcement treaty. Even common law courts that do
not employ the partie civile mechanism may enforce the civil portion of these
judgments on the basis of their procedures for the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign judgments. 23
Victims of human rights abuses are increasingly utilizing the partie civile
system to seek legal redress. 24 In many respects, this phenomenon is exem-
plified by the proceedings in Spain against Chilean General and self-
appointed Senator for Life Augusto Pinochet and other Latin American for-
mer officials. 25 In 1996, numerous groups and individuals commenced
criminal proceedings in Spain arising out of the torture and disappearances
of Spanish and other nationals in Argentina and Chile. The victims reserved
the right to seek civil reparations at the conclusion of the criminal proceed-
ings. The public prosecutors appealed the cases on various jurisdictional
grounds, but the Spanish National Criminal Court (Audencia National) up-
held jurisdiction in October 1998 on the basis of a Spanish law that allows
for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over acts committed abroad that
amount to genocide or terrorism when this jurisdiction is provided for in
Spanish law or when Spain is obliged to exercise such jurisdiction according
party may be constituted at any time); § 374 STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [StPO][Code of criminal proce-
dure) (ER.G.).
19. See Jean Larguier, The Civil Action for Damages in French Criminal Procedure, 39 ThL. L. Rav. 687,
688 (1965).
20. See id. at 698; A.V. SHEEHAN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN SCOTLAND AND FRANCE 22 (1975) (dis-
cussing the procedural advantages and disadvantages ofparti civile system).
21. Jolowicz, supra note 17, at 10-11.
22. SHEEHAN, Supra note 20, at 20-21.
23. See, e.g., Raulin v. Fischer [1911] 2 K.B. 93 (Eng.).
24. See generally The Enforcement of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law by Civil Suits in Municipal
Courts: The Civil Dimension of Universal Jrisdiction, Remarks by Luc Reydams, Universal CriminalJurisdicton
as a Conditio Sine Qua Non for Universal Civil Jurisdiction, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASIJNVIR FOURTH
HAGUE JOINT CONFERENCE, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAw ISSUES: NEw FORMS, NEW APPLI-
CATIONS 166 (1997).
25. See generally Jaume Ferrer Lloret, Impunity in Cases of Serious Human Rights Violations: Argentina and
Chile, 3 SPANISH YB. INT'L L. 3, 20-21 (1993-94) (discussing cases filed by various non-governmental
organizations against Argentinean and Chilean defendants); Maria del Carmen Marquez Carrasco & Joa-
quin Alcaide Fernandez, In re Pinochet: Spanish National Court, Criminal Division (Plenary Session), 93 AM.
J. INT'L L. 690 (1999).
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to international treaties. 26 On the basis of this ruling, the Spanish courts
requested Pinochet's extradition to Spain.
27
Following Pinochet's detention in the United Kingdom, a group of Chil-
ean nationals residing in Belgium filed a criminal complaint against Pino-
chet requesting an international warrant for his arrest. Because the 1993 law
codifying the principle of universal jurisdiction was not yet in force, the in-
vestigating magistrate ruled that customary international law provided for
universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity and allowed the peti-
tion.28 Likewise, in France, family members of victims of the Pinochet re-
gime filed a criminal complaint against him, prompting the transmission of
two additional arrest warrants to the United Kingdom.
B. Cases Seeking to Enforce International Human Rights in
Common Law Jurisdictions
In contrast to the current trend in civil law jurisdictions, cases brought in
the United States seeking to enforce human rights norms are not typically
pursued as criminal actions despite the legal authority and, in some cases,
obligation to do so. Against this general backdrop of government inaction,
victims of human rights violations have, with a few noteworthy exceptions,
been forced to pursue purely civil cases instead. Many such civil cases have
been brought in the United States on the basis of several federal statutes
specifically authorizing such litigation. This section identifies the handful of
criminal prosecutions commenced in common law jurisdictions and then
provides an overview of the ways in which victims of human rights abuses
have sought civil redress in the United States.
1. Criminal Prosecutions in Common Law Jurisdictions
Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann29 marks the first major case brought
under the principle of universal jurisdiction in a common law state outside
of the immediate post-Second World War period. In asserting jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court of Israel reasoned that the "power to try and punish a
26. See Ley Orginica del Poder Judicial [L.O.P.J.], art. 23 (1985) (Spain).
27 See R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate exparte Pinochet Ugarre (No. 1), 4 All
ER. 897 (H.L. 1998) (U.K.); see also William J. Aceves, Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship: The
Pinochet Case and the Move Toward a Universal System of Transnational Law Litigation, 41 HARV. INT'L I.J.
129, 162-64 (2000).
28. See Luc Reydams, International Decision, Belgian Tribunal of First Instance of Brussels (investigating
magistrate), Nov. 8, 1998, 93 Am. J. INT'L L. 700 (1999) (discussing proceedings against Pinochet in
Belgium). Similarly, Belgian proceedings were initiated against a Rwandan national, Vincent Ntezimana,
after three additional Rwandan nationals were transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda. The victims joined the case as parties civiles. See REDRESS ThusT, supra note 11, at 21. Other
proceedings have been brought in France. See generally Brigitte Stem, International Decision, French
Tribual de Grande Instance, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 696 (1999); Brigitte Stern, International Decision, In re
Javor and In re Munyeshyaka, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 525 (1999) (discussing French cases in which French
parties constituted themselves as parties civiles in order to commence criminal prosecutions).
29. See 36 I.L.R. 5 (Jm. 1961), affd, 36 I.L.R. 277 (S. Ct. 1962) (Isr.).
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person for an offense ... is vested in every State regardless of the fact that
the offense was committed outside its territory by a person who did not be-
long to it."30
Since then, common law countries have undertaken a smattering of
criminal prosecutions relying upon extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Cana-
dian experience is instructive. For a fleeting period, the Canadian govern-
ment adopted a policy of criminally prosecuting and deporting Canadian
citizens found guilty of war crimes in Nazi-occupied Europe in response to
recommendations of a Commission of Inquiry into Nazi War Criminals in
Canada ("the Deschenes Commission"). 31 Accordingly, the Canadian gov-
ernment amended its criminal code to authorize a limited form of extraterri-
torial jurisdiction allowing for prosecutions of war crimes or crimes against
humanity in which the individual accused was a Canadian citizen, a citizen
of a country at war with Canada, or where the victim was a Canadian citizen
or a citizen of an ally of Canada.32 In March 1994, the Supreme Court of
Canada rendered its first decision under the 1987 amendment to the crimi-
nal code, upholding by a vote of four to three the acquittal of Imre Finta,
who had been accused of committing war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity against Hungarian Jews during the Second World War.33
In part as a result of what were perceived as prohibitively high standards
established by the Finta case,34 the Canadian government announced in
January 1995 a shift in its strategy for addressing the presence of individuals
accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. Under the
new policy, instead of prosecuting individuals, the government would re-
spond with administrative actions seeking the denaturalization, revocation
of citizenship, and/or deportation of offenders.3 5
In contrast to some other common law jurisdictions,36 there are no
significant criminal cases for torture and crimes against humanity in the
30. See 36 I.L.R. at 298. The court also invoked the "passive personality" principle. Id. at 304.
31. See CANADA, COMM'N OF INQUIRY ON WAR CRIMINALS, REPORT pt. 1 (1986).
32. See CRIMINAL CODE, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 7(3.71) (1985) (Can.). Despite the broad authorization ofjurisdiction, prosecutions were severely limited. Canada has enacted legislation incorporating the terms
of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I thereto into domestic law. Geneva Conventions Act, R.S.C.,
ch. G-3 (1985) (Can.).
33. See R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701.
34. See generally Judith Hippler Bello & Irwin Cotler, International Decision, Regina v. Finta, 90 AM.
J. IN'L L. 460, 467-73 (1996) (critiquing the Supreme Court of Canada's imposition of high thresholds
of proof for the actus reus and mens rea elements of war crimes and crimes against humanity). Essentially
the Supreme Court held that the prosecution must show the accused had the mens rea of either a war
crime or a crime against humanity (the intent to commit a systematic attack against a civilian popula-
tion), as well as the mens rea of the specific offense such as torture or murder. Given the paucity of avail-
able evidence, the prosecutors found this a nearly insurmountable hurdle.
35. See Citizenship: Governnent Determined to Meet its Commitment to Canadians in War Crimes Initative,
CANADIAN CORPORATE NEwswim, July 27, 1999; Canada is Strengthening its Approach to Bringing War
Criminals to Justice, CANADA NEwsWiia, July 21, 1998; CANADA, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CANADA'S WAR
CRIMES PROGRAM (1999).
36. For example, in Scotland, Mohammed Mahgoub, a Sudanese doctor, was charged with torturing
detainees following the 1989 coup in Sudan. In May 1999, however, the prosecution dropped the charges
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United States despite the legality of such prosecutions. Pursuant to the Con-
vention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment ("the Torture Convention"), the United States enacted a stat-
ute authorizing the exercise of universal jurisdiction by U.S. courts over tor-
ture committed extraterritorially.37 The statute grants jurisdiction where the
alleged offender is a national of the United States or where the alleged of-
fender is present in the United States, regardless of the nationality of either
victim or offender. However, despite receiving credible information about
the presence of human rights abusers within the United States, this statute
has yet to be utilized. 38
2. Civil Suits in Common Law Jurisdictions
Given the apparent unwillingness of common law countries to initiate
criminal prosecutions on the basis of universal jurisdiction, civil suits have
become an important vehicle for victims of human rights abuses to enforce
international law and obtain legal redress. In the United States in particular,
victims of human rights violations have pursued federal civil cases alleging
tort violations against human rights abusers a number of times over the last
two decades.39 To proceed, U.S. federal courts must have both subject-
matter jurisdiction over the claim and personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dant. This section describes the statutory framework that governs these suits
in the United States. It then discusses the two most important forms of per-
sonal jurisdiction in such cases brought against alien defendants-transient
jurisdiction and doing-business jurisdiction. Finally, the section provides a
brief overview of the way in which personal jurisdiction is exercised, noting
that cases seeking to enforce human rights norms in domestic courts are of-
ten predicated on transitory or doing-business jurisdiction.
without explanation. See James Rougvie, Sudan Torture Charges Dropped, ScOTSmAN, May 28, 1999, at 4.
See aho Polyukhovich v. Commonwealth of Australia (1991) 172 CLR 501 (discussing the constitution-
ality of a war crimes prosecution in Australia).
37. This statute provides that
Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit torture shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct
prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for
life.
18 U.S.C. § 2340a (1994). Likewise, The Hostage Taking Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1994), provides for
universal jurisdiction over any individual who, "whether inside or outside the United States, seizes or
detains and threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain another person in order to compel a third
person or a governmental organization to do or abstain from doing any act .... " See also United States v.
Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that the Hostage-Taking Act provided a basis for exer-
cising jurisdiction over an accused hijacker).
38. On several occasions, organizations working with refugee communities have presented the U.S.
government with dossiers on individuals present in the United States who are accused of having commit-
ted torture. To date, the government has generally refused to act. Interview with Gerald Gray, Executive
Director, The Center for Justice & Accountability, in San Francisco, Cal. (June 5, 2000). See, e.g., Coletta
Youngers, The Pmochet Ricochet, NATION, May 8, 2000, at 5 (discussing the intervention of the U.S. gov-
ernment to prevent torture prosecution).
39. S&e generally STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 4 (analyzing civil human rights cases).
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a. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction over Human Rights Claims in Courts
In the United States, cases seeking to enforce human rights norms pro-
ceed under several subject-matter jurisdiction statutes.40 Although the ma-
jority of such suits have been brought in federal court under the aforemen-
tioned statutes, they may also be pursued in state court,41 as jurisdiction
over such suits is concurrent between state and federal courts.42 The most
frequently invoked federal statute is the ATCA.43 The ATCA was a compo-
nent of the Judiciary Act4 4 passed by the First Continental Congress to es-
tablish the federal court system. The statute was first applied to a claim in-
volving international human rights norms in Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala,4' in
which a federal court found a Paraguayan national liable for acts of torture
and summary execution. 46
More recently, the U.S. Congress passed the TVPA47 in order to carry out
"the intent of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman,
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment." 48 The House Report on the TVPA
40. Although all judicial systems recognize the principle of personal jurisdiction, the concept of sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction is in many respects a unique feature of U.S. law with its roots in the American
system of federalism. The October Draft Convention does not regulate subject-matter jurisdiction. The
topic is discussed here because it is central to understanding the legal basis for pursuing cases seeking to
enforce human rights norms in U.S. courts.
41. See, e.g., Alomang v. Freeport-McMoran, 97-1349 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/4/98), 718 So. 2d 971, reh'g
granted, 97-1349 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4115198), 718 So. 2d 971, 974 (class action in state court against a
corporation accused of committing cultural genocide and environmental and other human rights viola-
tions in Indonesia).
42. See Filarriga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 R2d 876, 887 n.22 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that alien plaintiffs have
a choice of jurisdictions in which to bring suit).
43. ATCA, supra note 4. The term "alien" is defined under federal law as a citizen or subject of a for-
eign government. 28 U.S.C. § 2502 (1994).
44. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76 (1789). See Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 73 (1923) (noting that the Judiciary Act grants juris-
diction to the federal courts over both common law crimes and violations of the law of nations).
45. 630 E2d at 878 ("Construing this rarely-invoked provision, we hold that deliberate torture perpe-
trated under color of official authority violates universally accepted norms of the international law of
human rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties.").
46. Prior to Filartiga, the statute was "virtually ignored" for 200 years. STEPHENS & RATNER, supra
note 4, at 7. See Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 E Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607) (finding jurisdiction over suit
for restitution of property seized at war); Adra v. Clift, 195 E Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961) (finding that
kidnapping and internationally transporting a child on a false passport constitutes a violation of the law
of nations).
47. TVPA, supra note 5. The statute provides that
An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation-sub-
jects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual; or
subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the in-
dividual's legal representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful
death.
Ia. § 2(a). The definition of torture conforms to that in the Torture Convention. Id. § 3(b). The definition
of extrajudicial killing is related to the definition in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions: "the
term 'extrajudicial killing' means a deliberated killing nor authorized by a previous judgment pro-
nounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples." Id. § 3(a).
48. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 3 (1992). See generally Rachael E. Schwartz, "And Tomorrow?" The Torture
Viaim Protection Act, 11 AaIz. J. INTL' & COMP. L. 271, 284 (1994) (noting that the TVPA "serves to
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noted that the Torture Convention is "enforcement-oriented" in that it "ob-
ligates state parties to adopt measures to ensure that torturers are held le-
gally accountable for their acts" and that "[o]ne such obligation is to provide
means of civil redress to victims of torture."49 The legislative history makes
clear that the intent of Congress was to codify the Filartiga result and to
extend the right of access to federal courts to U.S. citizens.3 0 This history
also stresses the importance of protecting human rights around the world
and of granting access to U.S. courts to victims of torture and extrajudicial
killing. 1
With the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990,52 the United States incorporated
the international prohibition against terrorism into domestic law and pro-
vided for both criminal 53 and civil 54 penalties for offenders. The legislative
history of this statute reveals an intent to thwart terrorism by enhancing the
power of private citizens to combat acts of terrorism. 55 Accordingly, the
statute provides an express right to victims of international terrorist attacks
(and so-called "indirect victims" such as survivors and heirs) to seek civil
redress. Federal courts may seize assets within the jurisdictional reach of
U.S. courts in order to render it unprofitable to engage in terrorist activities
and to prevent terrorists from soliciting and maintaining assets within the
fulfill internationally agreed-upon obligations with respect to torture and extrajudicial killing").
49. H.R. REP. No. 102-367, pt. 1, at 3 (1991).
50. Se id. at 4 ("Claims based on torture or summary executions do not exhaust the list of actions that
may appropriately be covered by section 1350. That statute should remain intact to permit suits based on
other norms that already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary international law.").
51. S. REP. No. 102-249, supra note 48, at 3 (predicting that "torturers and death squads will no
longer have a safe haven in the United States").
52. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-39 (1994). The statute addresses itself to "international terrorism," which is
defined as activities that
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of
the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the ju-
risdiction of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended-(i) to intimidate or coerce
a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of
the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or co-
erce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
18 U.S.C. § 2331(1). The Act also addresses the use of certain weapons of mass destruction. Id. § 2332a.
53. The statute grants the federal government the power to prosecute individuals accused of commit-
ting homicide or other related conduct against a U.S. national overseas, so long as it is determined that
the offense "was intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a government or a civilian popula-
tion." Id. § 2332a-d. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 927 E Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
54. The statute also provides that
[a]ny national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an
act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appro-
priate district court of the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains
and the cost of the suit, including attorney's fees.
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).
55. See generally Dean C. Alexander, Maritime Terrorism and Legal Responses, 19 DEN. J. INT'L L. &
PoLY 529 (1991) (noting that private sanctions are an integral part of the U.S. regime against terrorism);
Jennifer A. Rosenfeld, Note, The Antiterorism Act of 1990: Bringing International Terrorists to Justice the
American Way, 15 SuFFoLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 726, 741-42 (1992).
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United States. The drafters also wished to ensure that victims were not left
without a remedy, especially if, for evidentiary or other reasons, criminal
charges could not or would not be brought.56
Finally, victims of human rights abuses may attempt to file suit directly
against a responsible state under the FSIA.57 Most courts, however, have
found that the FSIA immunizes nations from suit58 for violations under the
terms of the statute. The statute provides that states are generally immune
from suit except in any case, inter alia,
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly
or by implication... (2) in which the action is based upon a commer-
cial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon
an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the terri-
tory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of
the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the
United States; ... (5)... in which money damages are sought against a
foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of prop-
erty, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or
omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of that for-
56. See Rosenfeld, supra note 55, at 737 n.36 .
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1994) states that
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction ... of any nonjury civil action against a foreign
state ... to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to
immunity either under sections 1605-07 of this title or under any applicable international agree-
ment.
Id. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) represents the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over
a foreign state in U.S. courts. See also Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S.
428, 434 (1989). It authorizes the exercise of long-arm personal jurisdiction when constitutional stan-
dards are satisfied. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). The FSIA is available to foreign as well as citizen plaintiffs.
See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480,484-86 (1983).
58. See, eg., Doe v. Unocal, 963 E Supp. 880, 888 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (finding state defendants entitled
to sovereign immunity); Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 E3d 1166, 1173-74 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (declining to rule that a state impliedly waives its immunity when it violates jus cogens norms),
amended by Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 871 E Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1994) (clarifying the Court
of Appeals' ruling dismissing the Federal Republic of Germany from the action), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
1121 (1997); Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 736 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990) (denying
relief on the grounds that no implied exception to sovereign immunity exists even for clear violations of
international law). But see Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 E2d 699, 711-23 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1017 (1993) (rejecting the argument that states are not immune for viola-
tions ofjus cogens norms, but finding expropriation claims to be within the FSIA's commercial tort excep-
tion and torture claims to invoke the waiver exception of the FSIA, because Argentina had pursued
Siderman in the United States); Lerelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F Supp. 665, 671-72 (D.D.C. 1980)
(finding that the assassination in Washington, D.C. of former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier and
his assistant qualified as a tortious act within the United States). See generally Mathias Reimann, A Human
Rights Exception to Sovereign Immunity: Some Thoughts on Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 16 MiCH.
J. INT'L L. 403 (1995) (addressing the problem of denying victims of human rights abuses the opportu-
nity to sue the foreign sovereign charged with the violations).
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eign state while acting within the scope of his office or employment
59
In 1996, Congress amended the FSIA to include a limited human rights
exception to sovereign immunity.6° This provision allows for suit to be
brought by foreigners against a state or one of its officials or employees if
"money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or
death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft
sabotage, [or] hostage taking"61 where the state has been designated a stare-
sponsor of terrorism. 62 The commercial activity, direct effects, and human
rights exceptions allow for the exercise of jurisdiction over acts that occurred
abroad, 63 so long as the constitutionally required jurisdictional contacts are
satisfied.
b. Personal Jurisdiction over Human Rights Violators in U.S. Courts
U.S. jurisprudence regarding the due process principles applicable to the
exercise of personal jurisdiction has evolved considerably since the U.S. Su-
preme Court first addressed this issue in 1877 in Pennoyer v. Neff.'4 Origi-
nally, the Court based the exercise of in personam jurisdiction on notions of
physical presence and power and the theory that states may exercise jurisdic-
tion over any entity within their territory. In this century, however, the
Court has increasingly analyzed personal jurisdiction using principles of due
process and fairness, rather than territoriality.65 In the leading case on this
subject, International Shoe v. Washington,66 the Court permitted the exercise of
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1994). Traditionally, foreign states were considered entirely immune from
suit. See, eg., Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812) (premising the com-
mon law rule of sovereign immunity on the "perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns").
Over time, however, the notion of absolute sovereign immunity gave rise to a more restricted immunity
eventually codified in the FSIA, which grants sovereign immunity to states-engaged in public acts (jure
imperi), but withholds it from states acting in their private or commercial activities (jure gestionis). See,
e.g., Tate Letter, 26 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 984-85 (1952), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Re-
public of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 app.2, at 711-15 (1976).
60. See Act of Apr. 24, 1996, Pub. L. 104-32, title II, § 221(a), 110 Star. 1241.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (7) (1999).
62. The U.S. Department of State has designated seven states as state-sponsors of terrorism: Cuba,
Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. 22 C.F.R. § 126.1(d) (2000). See, e.g., Flatow v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 12-19 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding the FSIA § 1605(aX7) exception to
foreign sovereign immunity applicable as against Iran); Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 E Supp.
2d 62, 68-70 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding the exception applicable as against Iran); Alejandre v. Republic of
Cuba, 996 E Supp. 1239, 1247-48 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (finding the exception applicable as against Cuba),
vacadedsub nor. Alejandre v. Telefbnica Langa Distancia de PR., Inc., 185 E3d 1277 (11th Cir. 1999).
63. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc., 626 E2d 270, 273 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding jurisdiction
over tort claims arising from extraterritorial acts when defendant carried on commercial activities within
the United States). See also Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 E3d 1166, 1172-73 (holding
lingering effects of personal injuries from slave labor insufficient to support the exercise of jurisdiction
based upon the tort exception to the FSIA).
64. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
65. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437,444-45 (1952).
66. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation that was not served while present
in the state so long as the defendant maintained certain "minimum con-
tacts" with the jurisdiction such that the suit did not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."67 Related to this notion is "do-
ing-business jurisdiction," which is based on the theory that individuals or
entities that carry on a certain level of business activity within a jurisdiction
should be amenable to general jurisdiction there.68
Despite this trend, however, the Court has found that exercising jurisdic-
tion solely on territorial grounds remains fair from a due-process perspec-
tive. In Burnham v. Superior Court of California,69 the Court invoked the terri-
toriality principle first articulated in Pennoyer and reaffirmed the continued
validity of physical presence, however fleeting, as a sufficient basis for the
exercise of general jurisdiction. Burnham involved domestic parties, but
given the Court's analysis, it is likely that it would uphold the exercise of
transient jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. Burnham has, in fact, been
applied to uphold the exercise of transient jurisdiction over foreign defen-
dants only temporarily in the forum.70 Thus, under current U.S. law, general
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant may be exercised on the basis of either
the defendant's presence in the forum or on the basis of the defendant's con-
tinuous, systematic, and purposeful activities in the forum.7'
The continuing vitality of personal jurisdiction on the basis of territorial-
ity has been crucial to plaintiffs seeking to enforce human rights norms in
U.S. courts. Personal jurisdiction in many such cases is based on transient
jurisdiction.72 For example, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
transient personal jurisdiction over Radovan Karadzi6, the self-proclaimed
political leader of the Bosnian Serbs. 73 Additionally, cases have been brought
67. Id. at 316.
68. See, eg., Perkins, 342 U.S. 437, 445-46 (upholding personal jurisdiction over foreign corporation
engaged in systematic and continuous activities in the forum).
69. 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990).
70. See, e.g., Bourassa v. Desrochers, 938 E2d 1056, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 1991).
71. Transient jurisdiction is not a purely U.S. phenomenon. However, when the United Kingdom ac-
ceded to the Brussels Convention in 1978, the list of prohibited bases of jurisdiction was expanded to
include transient jurisdiction as it was practiced in England and Scotland. See Civil Jurisdiction and
Judgments Act, ch. 27, art. 3 (1982) (reproducing the text of the Lugano Convention and stating that
the rule in that Convention which allows jurisdiction to be founded upon service of process while the
defendant is temporarily in the United Kingdom does not apply under the Hague Convention).
72. See Filariga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 E2d 876, 878-79 (2d Cir. 1980) (upholding transient personal ju-
risdiction with respect to defendant who was in the United States with an expired visitor's visa); Fori v.
Suarez-Mason, 672 E Supp. 1531, 1536 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (upholding transient personal jurisdiction
where defendant was served while in custody and awaiting an extradition hearing); Cabiri v. Assasie-
Gyimah, 921 .Supp. 1189, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (upholding transient personal jurisdiction where
defendants, Ghanian military officials, were temporarily in the United States); Mushikiwabo v. Barayag-
wiza, No. 94 Civ. 3627, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4409, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1996) (upholding tran-
sient personal jurisdiction where defendant was served while in the United States attending a session of
the United Nations); cf Patricia Hurtado, Survivors: Justice for Tiananmen/Court Damages Sought for Rights
Abuse, NEWSDAY, Sept. 1, 2000, at A03 (reporting a claim brought in the United States against Li Peng,
former Chinese Premier, alleging human rights violations during the Tiananmen Square massacre),
73. See Kadi6 v. Karadzi6, 70 E3d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1995).
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against non-resident corporations on the basis of general doing-business ju-
risdiction. For example, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld per-
sonal jurisdiction in New York over Royal Dutch Shell, a British/Dutch
company.74 Jurisdiction over individuals may be obtained on the basis of
continuous, substantial, and systematic activities within the forum state.75
At the same time, cases within the United States have also been brought
against defendants who would qualify as "resident" within the United
States.76 This includes cases brought against corporations that are incorpo-
rated within the United States. 77 Cases within contracting states and against
"resident" defendants will be largely unaffected by the proposed Conven-
tion's jurisdictional regime because the Convention adopts as its general rule
that individuals may be sued where they reside. Accordingly, judgments
arising from such cases would benefit from automatic enforcement under
proposed Article 26(1).
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL REDRESS IN DOMESTIC FoIR
Suits seeking civil redress in domestic courts play an important role in the
worldwide effort to enforce international norms concerned with the protec-
tion of international human rights. Civil suits provide a mechanism by
which individual victims can initiate and control the legal process. They
contribute toward the rehabilitation of victims, the deterrence of future
abuses, and the enunciation of norms in ways that other forms of redress may
not. Despite efforts to create mechanisms of accountability for human rights
abuses on the international or regional level, few international institutions
are directly accessible to individual victims. Further, many of these interna-
tional institutions are quasi-judicial bodies that cannot hold individuals ac-
countable or issue enforceable damage awards on behalf of individual vic-
tims. For example, the ad hoc tribunals created during the mid-1990s for
Rwanda and Yugoslavia, while extremely successful in articulating norms of
international law, are able to prosecute only a fraction of violators and are
not empowered to provide victims with pecuniary or other material redress.
As a result, domestic courts may provide victims with a form of redress that
is unattainable in international and regional fora. Finally, civil suits in do-
74. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 99-7223(L), 99-7245, 2000 WL 1290355, at "5-'10
(2d Cir. Sept. 14, 2000) (affirming the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants
under New York's doing-business statute). But see Doe v. Unocal Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1181-85
(C.D. Cal. 1998) (dismissing a claim against defendant for lack of specific or general jurisdiction).
75. See, e.g., Byung Wha An v. Doo-Hwan Chun, No. 96-35971, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 1303, at *5
(9th Cir. Jan 28, 1998) (finding that defendant's contacts were insufficient for the exercise of general or
specific jurisdiction in a case involving claims of torture and summary execution against a Korean
official).
76. See, e.g., Paul v. Avril, 901 E Supp. 330 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (allowing claim against defendant, a for-
mer military ruler of Haiti, who was a resident in Florida).
77. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 1. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan,
969 F Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997) (upholding jurisdiction in a suit against a Louisiana-based corporation
accused of committing human rights violations in Indonesia; suit dismissed on other grounds).
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mestic courts contribute to the fulfillment of states' obligations under inter-
national law to provide victims of human rights violations with civil repara-
tions. Given the important goals satisfied by civil redress, the current limi-
tations on international enforcement mechanisms, and the right of victims
to reparations, it is vital that victims of human rights violations retain the
ability to bring civil claims within domestic fora.
A. The Importance of Civil Redress
Civil redress represents a valuable tool in the enforcement of international
human rights norms and the rehabilitation of victims. First and foremost,
given that the effectiveness of criminal remedies depends upon state discre-
tion,7 8 civil cases can be commenced where the government with criminal
jurisdiction over the offender is unwilling to prosecute for evidentiary or
political reasons.7 9 Further, even where criminal prosecutions occur, civil
suits provide an effective complement to such proceedings as they "offer vic-
tims of violence a legal remedy which they control and which may satisfy
needs not met by the criminal law system."80 Civil cases also involve the
victim directly in the legal process. The victim chooses to initiate the pro-
ceeding and then plays a central role throughout. Attorneys and advocates
working with victims of human rights abuses have observed that this active
participation within the legal system can be empowering and can restore a
sense of justice within victims of grave human rights abuses for whom the
courts of their countries provided no recourse. 8'
Tort law seeks to achieve a number of goals that are to some degree mutu-
ally reinforcing. 82 The most salient goal is the financial indemnification of
the plaintiff in response to proven losses that society believes victims should
78. See Schwartz, supra note 48, at 333-34.
The executive may decide, rightly or wrongly, not to prosecute certain crimes-even though it finds
them abhorrent-because official foreign policy is committed to backing or appeasing certain re-
gimes. In such situations, even the executive might favor a cause of action beyond its control to re-
dress individual injuries.
'Id.
79. See John E Murphy, Civil Liability for the Commission of International Crimes as an Alternative to
Criminal Prosecution, 12 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 1, 47-49 (1999) (arguing in favor of civil suits over criminal
suits given, in part, the lower standards of proof and the increased availability of discovery devices).
80. Beth Stephens, Conceptualizing Violence Under International Law: Do Tort Remedies Fit the Crime?, 60
ALB. L. REv. 579, 581 (1997).
81. Interview with Gerald Gray, Executive Director, The Center for Justice & Accountability, in San
Francisco, Cal. (Oct. 15, 1999). See also Jose E. Alvarez, Rosh to Closure: Lessons of the TadicJudgment, 96
MICH. L. REV. 2031, 2102 (1998) (noting the psychological benefits of civil suits to victims).
82. See Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Viola-
tions of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. ESCOR, 45th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4, at
56, U.N. Doc. EICN.41Sub.2/199318 (1993) [hereinafter Study on Reparations] ("Reparation for human
rights violations has the purpose of relieving the suffering of and affording justice to victims by removing
or redressing to the extent possible the consequences of the wrongful acts and by preventing and deter-
ring violations."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1977) (stating the purposes of tort damages
to be compensation, indemnity, or restitution for harms; to determine rights; to punish wrongdoers and
deter wrongful conduct; and to vindicate parties).
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not have to bear. In theory at least, this occurs through the restoration of the
status quo ante-i.e., the return of the plaintiff to a position that is, as
nearly as possible, equivalent to his position prior to the commission of the
tort. 3 Thus, the most common remedy provided by a civil suit is an award
of money damages, 84 which includes compensation for non-pecuniary but
legally recognized harms, such as pain and suffering, solatium, or so-called
moral damages.8 5
To be sure, in the context of human rights violations, any award of money
damages will be incommensurate to the harm the individual victim suffers,
as a money judgment is clearly no equivalent to the harm suffered.8 6 The
impact of torture on the life of a victim can never be fully quantified. How-
ever, money damages can compensate the victim for pain, emotional distress,
bodily harm, and lost wages and earning potential.8 7 Further, such damages
will assist victims in obtaining the therapy they need for as complete a reha-
bilitation as possible.
As an additional goal, tort law seeks to deter unreasonably dangerous or
unwelcome conduct on the theory that defendants, who do not want to pay
money damages, will refrain from engaging in the unreasonable behavior.88
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 82, § 901.
84. See DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY, RESTITUTION
135 (2d ed. 1993) (stating that "[t]he damages remedy is a judicial award in money payable as compensa-
tion to one who has suffered a legally recognized injury or harm").
85. See Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Viola-
tions of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. ESCOR, 42d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4, at
8-9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.211990/10 (1990).
86. See. ag., Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, No. 94 Civ. 3627, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4409, at *6
(S.D.N.Y Apr. 8, 1996) (noting that the judge had seen "no other case in which monetary damages were
so inadequate to compensate the plaintiffs for the injuries caused by a defendant" and arguing that "one
can not place a dollar value on the lives lost as the result of the defendant's actions and the suffering
inflicted on the innocent victims of his cruel campaign. Unfortunately, however, a monetary judgment is
all the Court can award these plaintiffs."); see also MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FOR-
GIvENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 102-05 (1999).
87. DOBBS, supra note 84, § 8.1; see also Study on Reparations (1993), supra note 82, at 57.
Compensation shall be provided for any economically assessable damage resulting from human
rights violations, such as (a) Physical or mental harm; (b) Pain, suffering and emotional distress;
(c) Lost opportunities, including education; (d) Loss of earnings and earning capacity; (e) Reasonable
medical and other expenses of rehabilitation; (f) Harm to property or business, including lost
profits; (g) Harm to reputation or dignity; (h) Reasonable costs and fees of legal or expert assistance
to obtain a remedy.
Id.
88. Tort law manifests both species of deterrence: specific and general. Specific deterrence operates
against individuals who have already engaged in undesirable conduct, whereas general deterrence is
directed at society at large in an attempt to prevent others from engaging in such conduct. See George
Norris Stavis, Collecting Judgments In Human Rights Torts Cases-Flexibility For Non-Profit Litigators?, 31
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 209, 217 (1999) ("Vigorous tort litigation against such persons may reduce
the incidence of such acts, as it does in more conventional arenas. On the other hand, failure to prosecute
and collect such claims may embolden wrongdoers to the notion that their deeds bear no consequences
from the international community."). As with all torts, the contribution of civil suits against human
rights abusers toward the deterrence of human rights violations is impossible to measure. It could be
argued that a human rights violator is unlikely to be deterred by any legal sanction. Even so, the pursuit
of civil suits still contributes to the rehabilitation of victims and may at least prevent perpetrators from
leaving or investing outside of their home countries for fear of either being sued or of having their assets
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In other words, tort law seeks to make the risk of injury appear more costly
than the value of the undesirable conduct itself. Suits within national courts
may also serve to deter perpetrators from travelling or investing abroad, thus
confining them in their home countries and depriving them of a safe harbor
elsewhere.
To this end, national systems may also allow for the award of exemplary or
punitive damages.8 9 The theory is that in some cases, compensatory damages
alone would be insufficient to effectuate deterrence. In addition to this de-
terrent function, exemplary damages may also be viewed as expressly puni-
tive. In the United States in particular, intentional torts manifesting willful
or wanton behavior can give rise to punitive damages designed to punish the
defendant without reference to the amount of harm actually sustained by the
plaintiff. Exemplary damages may also be justified as a reflection of the ag-
gravated harm suffered by the plaintiff,90 or they may redress incalculable
economic harm or financial losses not otherwise accounted for, such as attor-
neys' fees.
Civil suits have the potential to revive the dignity of victims and satisfy a
demand for justice.9 1 In this way, the pursuit of a civil suit may contribute
to the satisfaction of the victim-a notion that is deemed by some to be an
independent objective of the tort system. 92 As a related function, tort law is
concerned with the definition and defense of social norms by expressing a
consensus about the way in which people should relate to and interact with
each other and by communicating that consensus to the general populace.93
A judgment ordering the payment of money damages necessarily includes an
attached.
89. See Stephens, supra note 80, at 582 ("The line between criminal law and tort law is blurred by the
imposition in tort damages of punitive damages, which address the moral culpability of the tortfeasor.").
For examples of such punitive damage awards, see Paul v. Avril, 901 E Supp. 330, 336 (S.D. Fla. 1994)
(awarding punitive damages to reflect "the egregiousness of the defendant's conduct, the central role he
played in the abuses, and the international condemnation with which these abuses are viewed"); Filartiga
v. Pefia-Irala, 577 E Supp. 860, 866 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) ("Punitive damages are designed not merely to
teach a defendant not to repeat his conduct but to deter others from following his example.").
90. See Hans Stoll, Consequences of Liability: Remedies, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CoM-
PARATIVE LAw, pt. II, ch. 8, at sec. 109 (Andr6 Tunc ed., 1986).
91. See Andr6 Tunc, Introduction, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, pt. 1,
at 1-96 (Andr Tunc ed., 1983) ("The law of tort should serve the fulfillment of justice, at least if a
compensatory justice, not a punishing one, is contemplated.").
92. See Stoll, supra note 90, at 9.
[I]n order to restore the "disturbed equilibrium of the injured person," a new and different pleasur-
able experience must artificially be provided the injured party as a counterpoise to the painful expe-
rience which cannot be dispelled. One acceptable means of achieving this goal might be the declara-
tion and condemnation of the wrong. (citations omitted)
Id.
93. See Harold Hongju Koh, Civil Remedies for Uncivil Wrongs: Combating Terrorism Through Trayna-
tional Public Law Litigation, 22 Thx. INT'L L.J. 169, 185 (1987). In this way, a civil judgment "awarding
compensatory and punitive damages to a victim of terrorism serves the twin objectives of traditional tort
law, compensation and deterrence. At the same time, the judgment promotes the objectives of public
international law by furthering the development of an international rule of law" condemning the interna-
tional crime. Id.
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assessment that a legal right of the plaintiff was violated, and each individ-
ual expression of liability "adds its voice to others in the international com-
munity collectively condemning [such acts) as an illegitimate means of
promoting individual and sovereign ends. '94 In comparison to a criminal
suit, a civil suit may better preserve a collective memory and "permit a more
thorough airing of victims' stories ... along with an expression of judicial
solicitude." 95 In this regard, a criminal proceeding may be focused on the
culpability of the perpetrator at the expense of the harm suffered by the vic-
tim.
This is not to say that civil redress in domestic courts is necessarily supe-
rior to other forms of redress or other accountability mechanisms available to
victims of human rights violations. Rather, civil redress in domestic courts
constitutes an important component within a comprehensive and worldwide
regime for the enforcement of human rights. This regime operates at all lev-
els-international, regional, and municipal-and includes a variety of ac-
countability mechanisms, including judicial (civil and criminal), adminis-
trative, geo-political, retributive, restorative, and symbolic ones.96 Each of
these various mechanisms has certain strengths and weaknesses, but if inter-
national norms are to have any meaning, all should be available to victims in
search of redress.
B. The Dearth of International Enforcement Mechanisms
In the last decade, there have been significant and important develop-
ments toward the creation of international institutions to ensure account-
ability for human rights violations and end the culture of impunity enjoyed
by human rights violators. These efforts include the establishment of the
two ad hoc criminal tribunals to investigate and prosecute human rights
violations that occurred in the former Yugoslavia 97 and Rwanda;98 the future
94. Id.; see also Stephens, supra note 80, at 604-05 ("[A] judicial finding of liability puts a formal,
official stamp upon a judgment, which may at least partially satisfy the need for acknowledgement of the
wrong inflicted on the victims."). The Restatement of the Law of Torts recognizes that in determining
damages, one objective is "to determine rights." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 82,
§ 901(b).
95. Alvarez, supra note 81, at 2102.
96. See, e.g., Stephan Landsman, Alternative Responses to Serious Human Rights Abuser: Of Prosecution and
Trth Commissioms, 59 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROBS. 81 (1996) (comparing criminal prosecutions with truth
commissions). See generally RuTi TEITEL, TANSiTIONAL JUSTICE (2000) (discussing forms of accounting
for human rights violations); MioW, supra note 86 (discussing forms of securing accountability for
human rights violations).
97. See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Trritory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, annexed to
Report of the Seretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 3175th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/25704 (1993) thereinafter Yugoslavia Statute].
98. See International Criminal Trbunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Seri-
ow Violations of Iternational Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens
Reponsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, S.C. Res.
955, U.N. SCOR, 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994) [herein-
after Rwanda Statute].
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establishment of the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC),99 and
the proposed establishment of international courts to prosecute crimes
against humanity committed in Cambodia in the 1970s, 00 and crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed during the civil war in Sierra Leone. 10 1 These
international institutions, however, by necessity and design can and will
only address a limited number of perpetrators and conflicts. In fact, they are
specifically designed to complement, not supplant, the work of national ju-
dicial systems. 0 2
Ad hoc tribunals established to respond to the crises in the former Yugo-
slavia and Rwanda will never provide complete accountability for human
rights violations. Their jurisdiction is limited substantively, temporally, and
geographically; the jurisdiction of the two tribunals is limited to interna-
tional criminal law violations committed in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda since 1991 and in 1994, respectively. As indicated by their statutes,
and as their indictments attest, both tribunals generally concentrate on
prosecuting the most serious violations of international law 0 3 committed by
individuals high in the chain of command or certain exemplary cases where
the law is in need of clarification.104 It is likely that the temporal and geo-
graphic jurisdiction of a tribunal established to try individuals responsible
for violations of international law committed in Cambodia will be equally
restrictive.10 5 Further, the establishment of the two ad hoc tribunals by the
U.N. Security Council required a virtually unprecedented international con-
sensus.
106
Although the two ad hoc institutions are fully operational, apprehending
indictees-particularly those from the former Yugoslavia-remains an on-
going impediment to justice for victims. For example, Radovan Karadzi6
has been wanted since 1995 by the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on charges of genocide, crimes against humanity,
99. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiar-
ies on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONE183/9 (1998)
Thereinafter ICC Statute).
100. See Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Established Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution
52/135, U.N. Doc. A/53/850 (1999).
101. S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4186th mtg. at 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000),
available at http:llwww.un.org/Docs/sres/2000/res1315e.pdf (visited on Nov. 12, 2000).
102. See Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 97, art. 9(1) ("The International Tribunal and national courts
shall have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious violations of international humanitarian
law....").
103. See, e.g., id. art. 1 ("The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons respon-
sible for serious violations of international humanitarian law ... ").
104. See, e.g., Indictment, Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Kunarac, et al., Case No. IT-96-23-I (June 26,
1996) (seeking to clarify the status of rape as a war crime and a crime against humanity).
105. See U.N. Agrees to Limit Scope of Khmer Rouge Prosecution, JAPAN ECONOMIC NEWSWIRE, KYODO
NEWS SERVICE, July 11, 2000 (noting that the Cambodian draft bill to try members of the Khmer
Rouge was to be amended to allow for the trial of those "senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea [the
Khmer Rouge] and those who were responsible for crimes and serious violations").
106. Stephens, supra note 80, at 591.
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and violations of the laws or customs of war.107 Meanwhile, a number of
Bosnian victims sued Karadzi6 in the United States under the ATCA and
the TVPA for acts of genocide, war crimes, torture, extrajudicial killing, and
other violations of fundamental human rights committed by forces in the
former Yugoslavia under the defendant's command and control. 0 8 Given
Karadzi6's continued evasion of the ICTY, a U.S. civil judgment may be the
only justice achieved by his victims.10 9
The jurisdictional reach of the ICC will be similarly limited. First, pursu-
ant to the principle of complementarity, the ICC will operate only when the
domestic court with jurisdiction is unable or unwilling to prosecute. 110 Fur-
ther, the ICC will be limited to criminal prosecutions referred to the prose-
cutor by States Parties to the its statute or the U.N. Security Council, or
commenced by the prosecutor after having received authorization from the
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber."' The court will only be able to proceed if the state
in which the crime was committed or the state of the accused has ratified the
statute. And, cases that are being investigated by a national court or that are
not "of sufficient gravity" are considered inadmissible under Article 17 of
the Statute.' " 2
Institutions based on the U.N. Charter, international multilateral treaties,
or regional agreements typically address state responsibility and norm com-
pliance but do not assign liability to individual defendants, generate en-
forceable remedies, or provide victims with a judicial forum in which to bear
witness and confront their abusers. 113 For example, the Human Rights
Committee ("the Committee") of the International Covenant on Civil and
107. See Indictment, Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Karadzi6, Case No. 95-5-I (July 24, 1995); Indict-
ment, Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Karadzi6, Case No. 95-18-I (Nov. 14, 1995).
108. See Amended Complaint for Genocide; War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity; Summary
Execution; Forced Disappearance; Torture; Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment; Wrongful Death;
Assault and Battery; and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Harm, Doe v. Karadzid, No. 93 Civ. 0878
(S.D.N.Y. filed June 30, 1997); Kadid v. Karadzi6, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). The defendant was per-
sonally served with the summonses and complaints during two separate visits to New York City in early
1993, and the Court of Appeals sustained this assertion of civil jurisdiction. Id. at 248. Both the U.S.
Justice and State Departments supported the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant. See Statement of
Interest of the United States, Doe v. Karadzi6, Nos. 94-9035 and 94-9069 (2d Cir. Sept. 13, 1995).
109. One set of plaintiffs recently obtained a $745 million judgment against Karadzi. See Christine
Haughney & Bill Miller, Karadzic Told To Pay Victims $745 Million, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2000, at A13.
More recently, a $4.5 billion judgment was awarded in the companion case. See David Rohde,Jury In New
York Orders Bosnian Serb to Pay Billions, N.Y TiMsS, Sept. 26, 2000, at A1O.
110. See ICC Statute, supra note 99, arts. 17-19.
111. Id. arts. 13-15.
112. Id. art. 17(1Xd). See Cow. ON INT'L HuMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE, INT'L LAW ASS'N,
FINAL REPORT ON THE EXERCISE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN RESPECT OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS
OFFENSES 10 (2000) (emphasizing the role to be played by domestic courts in exercising extraterritorial
jurisdiction over international crimes given the limited jurisdiction of the ICC); see also ICC Statute, supra
note 99, Preamble ("It is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsi-
ble for international crimes.").
113. The International Court of Justice only adjudicates disputes between states. See Statute of the In-
tewrnttonal Court of.Justice, art. 34(1), 59 Star. 1055, 1059 (1945) ("Only states may be parties in cases
before the Court.").
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Political Rights"14 (ICCPR) is one of the few international treaty-based
bodies empowered to receive human rights complaints from individuals. 115
The Committee can entertain communications from victims of violations of
the ICCPR at the hands of a State Party, but the Committee cannot consider
violations by private entities rather than states themselves. 116 Not all Parties
to the ICCPR have ratified the Optional Protocol, and the Committee may
not receive complaints against States Parties that have not done so.
Further, the Committee is not an adjudicatory body. Instead, it employs a
policy of constructive dialogue that limits the Committee to "forwardting]
its views" to the individual and government concerned 17 and to seeking
"explanations or statements clarifying the matter."118 There is no judicial
process, confrontation between the parties, investigation, oral hearings or
formal judgment, and no perpetrator is identified or held individually liable.
The Committee can recommend specific remedies for victims, but it has
little leverage to ensure that states implement these recommendations. As
such, the case is effectively closed once the Committee forwards its views.
Individuals may convey communications to the U.N. Sub-Commission on
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 1 9 ("the Sub-Commission")
alleging human rights abuses within both member and non-member states.
114. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966,-
U.S.T.-, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966,-U.S.T.-,999 U.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter
Optional Protocol]. The Optional Protocol empowers the ICCPR Human Rights Committee to receive
complaints directly from citizens of States Parties thereto. Treaty-based organizations are established
pursuant to the terms of a specific treaty to monitor signatory compliance.
115. See generally Theo C. Van Boven, Protection of Human Rights through the United Nations System, in
GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 46, 49 (1984) ("[Ihe only procedure that is
operative and intended to deal with the human rights concerns of individuals is found in the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."). Another such procedure was
created by the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment, G.A. Res. 39146, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Annex 39, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51 (1984) [hereinafter Torture Convention]. Article 17 of the Torture Convention established the
Committee Against Torture to review State Party submissions and conduct cooperative investigations.
Under Article 21 of the Torture Convention, States Parties may also empower the Committee Against
Torture to consider submissions from other States Parties claiming that they are not fulfilling their obli-
gations under the Torture Convention, and under Article 22, States Parties may empower the Committee
Against Torture to consider communications from individual victims claiming violations by States Par-
ties.
116. See Optional Protocol, supra note 114. According to Article 1 of the Optional Protocol, in order
for a complaint to be admissible, the complainant must claim to be a victim of a violation of the Cove-
nant by a State Party that has ratified the Protocol. Articles 2 and 5(2)(b) counsel that the Committee
shall not consider any communication unless it has ascertained that all available local remedies have been
exhausted, unless such remedies are "unreasonably prolonged." Id.
117. Optional Protocol, supra note 114, art. 5(4).
118. Id. art. 4(2).
119. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights established the Sub-Commission on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights (originally named the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities), U.N. ESCOR, 4th Sess., Supp. 3, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/259 (1947). The
petition is considered first by a Working Group of the Sub-Commission, which in turn forwards accept-
able cases to the full Sub-Commission, which decides whether to forward the case onto the Commission.
These proceedings are conducted in near total confidentiality.
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This is the only U.N. procedure capable of accepting individual petitions. 120
In order for such petitions to be admissible, they must be submitted within
a reasonable time after the exhaustion of local remedies, provided such
remedies are "effective and not unreasonably prolonged. ' 121 This procedure
was designed for the consideration of systematic violations of human rights
by states, as opposed to individual or isolated violations. 122 Allegations of
singular incidents involving human rights violations will be considered as
evidence of such patterns if they are of sufficient quantity. However, these
individual cases do not give rise to judgments or remedies in and of them-
selves. 123 In fact, the Sub-Commission may refuse to consider a situation
that is not sufficiently serious or systematic, notwithstanding that a viola-
tion has clearly occurred.124
Further, the authors of such communications are denied direct involve-
ment in the process of review; once a communication is filed the dispute
becomes a confidential matter between the Sub-Commission (or the entire
Commission) and that state. 125 The outcome may be a decision by the entire
Human Rights Commission to conduct a thorough study of, or investiga-
tion within, the state complained against, with or without the consent of the
state. Despite the potential of such bodies, international adjudicatory
mechanisms in the U.N. system remain inherently ineffective. 126
Even regional human rights fora are not adequate substitutes for civil re-
dress in national courts. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights ("the
Inter-American Court"), for example, can issue binding decisions and award
compensation, but is not directly accessible to victims. 127 Rather, individu-
als who have exhausted local remedies 128 must first submit their case to the
120. See Procedure for Dealing with Communications Relating to Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freoms, E.S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. ESCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/RES/1503 (1970).
121. Dinah L. Shelton, Individual Complaint Machinery Under the United Nations 1503 Procedure and the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 59, 62 (1984).
122. U.N. ESCOR, 24th Sess., 627th mtg. at 50, U.N. Doc. EICN.4ISub.21323 (1971) ("Communi-
cations shall be admissible only if, after consideration thereof,... there are reasonable grounds to believe
that they may reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights and
fundamental freedoms.").
123. Se Shelton, supra note 121, at 60.
124. Seid. at 61.
125. Seeid. at 63-64.
126. One noted commentator has observed that:
Although the UN has developed a comprehensive set of international norms for the promotion and
protection of human rights, its system of actual implementation and supervision is still rudimen-
tary. At national levels well-developed, independent judicial systems and rules may exist ....
[A]lthough the UN might be able to provide a remedy in certain cases and situations, this can only
be considered a supplemental or complementary avenue of redress. The primary and most direct
remedy should ideally be available at the national level, and recourse should be sought at the inter-
national level only where domestic remedies are inadequate and ineffective.
Van Boven, supra note 115, at 55.
127. See Robert E. Norris, The Individual Petition Procedure of the Inter-American Systemfor the Protection of
Human Rights, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMALN RIGHTS PRACTICE 108, 125-26.
128. See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, arts. 46-47, Series no. 36, at 1, Or-
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Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ("the Inter-American Com-
mission"). 129 This body accepts communications from the state concerned,
seeks a resolution of the matter by "friendly settlement,"'130 and issues a re-
port to other member states setting forth facts and conclusions. 131 At this
point, the Inter-American Commission may, at its discretion, forward a par-
ticular case to the Inter-American Court so long as the state in question has
specifically accepted the Inter-American Court's adjudicatory jurisdiction. 132
The Inter-American Commission then becomes counsel of record in the case,
and the individual petitioner retains no formal role in the process.133 Perhaps
most importantly, the Inter-American Court can only address state responsi-
bility, not individual liability, and thus cannot consider violations by private
actors unless those persons are acting under color of law or are allowed to act
with impunity.134 If the Inter-American Court determines that there has
been a violation of the American Convention by the state involved, it may
issue a declaratory judgment and order remedial actions such as provisional
measures or reparations. 13'
Even the newly empowered European Court of Human Rights ("the
European Court"), operating under the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended in 1998
("the European Convention"), 136 is limited in the forms of redress it can offer
to individuals. Under Article 34, "any person, non-governmental organiza-
tion or group of individuals" may submit applications directly to the Euro-
pean Court, whose decisions are binding. 37 Cases are admissible, however,
only after all domestic remedies have been exhausted. 138 The judgments of
ganization of American States, Official Record, OEA/Ser.LIV/II.23 (entered into force July 18, 1978)
(hereinafter American Convention].
129. Individuals, groups of persons or non-governmental agencies may "lodge petitions with the
Commission containing denunciations or complaints of violation of this Convention by a State Party." Id.
art. 44. The Inter-American Commission can consider a case involving any state that is a member of the
Organization of American States, regardless of whether it has ratified the Inter-American Convention. Id.
130. Id. art. 49.
131. Id. arcs. 48-51.
132. See id. art. 62. Recently, Peru attempted to withdraw its acceptance of the adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion of the Inter-American Court with immediate effect after two applications that had been filed against
it before the Inter-American Court. On September 24, 1999, the Inter-American Court rejected the
purported withdrawal. See generally Douglass Cassel, Peru Withdraws from the Court: Will the Inter-American
Human Rights System Meet the Challenge?, 20 HuM. RTs. L.J. 167 (1999).
133. See American Convention, supra note 128, art. 61(1).
134. See, e.g., Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct.H.R. (1988), reprinted in Inter-Ameritan Court of
Human Rights: Judgment in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case (Forced Disappearance and Death of Individual in
Honduras), 28 I.L.M. 291, 319-20 (1989). See generally Kimberly King-Hopkins, Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights: Is Its Bark Worse than its Bite in Resolving Human Rights Disputes?, 35 TULSA LJ. 421
(2000) (analyzing the effectiveness of the Inter-American Commission).
135. See American Convention, supra note 128, art. 63.
136. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, amended hy Protocol 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, May 11, 1994, Eur. T.S. No. 155, available at http://conventions.
coe.inttreary/EN/Treaties/html/005.htm (visited on Oct. 18, 2000) [hereinafter European Convention].
137. Id art. 46(1).
138. See id. art. 35(1).
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the European Court cannot be enforced directly in the national courts of the
European Convention's signatories. 139 The European Court can award "just
satisfaction" to the injured party if the "internal law of the High Contract-
ing Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made,"'140 but this
award is to be paid by the state, not the individuals directly responsible.
Finally, members of the Organization of African Unity are in the process
of establishing an intergovernmental human rights court to complement the
African Commission on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights, 14 1 which can
accept communications concerning widespread violations of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.
14 2
The limitations of regional and international accountability mechanisms
render national courts vital human rights mechanisms. Indeed, many of the
statutes and treaties governing these international bodies specifically iden-
tify the primary role to be played by domestic courts in bringing human
rights violators to justice. 143 Further, a network of national courts that can
prosecute perpetrators is already in existence; therefore, there is no need to
rely on international political will to build additional international institu-
tions.1 44
C. The Right to Reparations
Nations have pledged among themselves to enforce human rights
norms, 145 protect the rights of victims of crime, and cooperate in the detec-
139. See Louis E. Wolcher, The Paradox of Remedies: The Case of International Human Rights Law, 38 Co-
LU. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 515, 552 (2000).
140. European Convention, supra note 136, art. 41.
141. See The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights established the African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Oct. 21, 1986,
art. 30, O.A.U. Doc. CABILEG.67/3 rev.5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) thereinafter African Charter).
142. Id., arts. 55-56.
143. Aceves, supra note 27, at 177.
144. Id. at 132.
145. As was noted by the U.S. government in its submission in the Filartiga case, "a refusal to recog-
nize a private cause of action in these circumstances might seriously damage the credibility of our na-
tion's commitment to the protection of human rights." Memorandum for the United States Submitted to
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, reprinted in 19 1.L.M. 585, 604
(1980) (No. 79-6090) [hereinafter Filartiga Memorandum). The Filartiga court noted that the interests
of the United States in the case were substantial:
In order to take the international condemnation of torture seriously this court must adopt a remedy
appropriate to the ends and reflective of the nature of the condemnation .... If the courts of the
United States are to adhere to the consensus of the community of humankind, any remedy they
fashion must recognize that this case concerns an act so monstrous as to make its perpetrator an
outlaw around the globe.
Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt,
FairalJurisdtction over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pefia-
Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53, 86-87 (1981) (noting that "the existence of international norms means
that the violator's presence in the forum state is itself an effect upon that state. His presence is likely to
become a source of embarrassment internationally, and can even inspire disturbances domestically," and
that "[a] refusal to allow victims redress in the courts only compounds the problem by casting doubt
upon the forum state's efforts 'to ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms ... are violated shall
have an effective remedy."') (quoting ICCPR, supra note 114, art. 2(3) (a)).
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tion and prosecution of persons suspected of having committed international
crimes. 14 6 In keeping with these overarching duties, a right to reparations on
the part of victims of human rights violations appears in numerous multilat-
eral instruments. Specifically, these treaties and declarations obligate states
to provide victims with legal redress, judicial access, and an enforceable
right to fair and/or adequate compensation. For example, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 147 the ICCPR,14s the American Conven-
tion, 149 and the Torture Convention 15 0 all require states to provide effective
146. See Question of the Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes Against
Humanity, G.A. Res. 2840 (XXVI), U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 88, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(1971) (affirming that "refusal by States to co-operate in the arrest, extradition, trial and punishment of
persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity is contrary to the purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations and to generally recognized norms of international law"); Declaration
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at
121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970) ("Every State has the duty to promote
through joint and separate action universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in accordance with the Charter."); Principles of International Co-operation in the Detection, Arrest,
Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 3074,
U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 78, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); Declaration of Basic Principles of
Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, G.A. Res. 40/34, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., 96th plen. mtg.,
Annex, Agenda Item 5, Supp. No. 53, at 213, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985) ("Judicial and administrative
mechanisms should be established and strengthened where necessary to enable victims to obtain redress
through formal or informal procedures ....").
147. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 8, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc.
A/810, at 73 (1948) ("Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals
for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law."),
148. According to Article 2(3) of the ICCPR:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person whose rights or
freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; (b) To ensure that any person
claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administra-
tive or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system
of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) To ensure that the competent
authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.
ICCPR, supra note 114, art. 2(3).
149. The American Convention obliges signatories to ensure that every person has the right to a
hearing to determine his rights and obligations of a civil nature. American Convention, supra note 128,
art. 8.1. Se also Velasquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 134, at 324. The Inter-American Court noted that:
the free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention to every person subject to its
jurisdiction ... implies the duty of the States Parties to organize the governmental apparatus and,
in general, all the structures through which public power is exercised, so that they are capable of ju-
ridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights.
Id
150. The Torture Convention requires each State Parry to take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over offences. More specifically, Article 14 of the Torture Convention states:
(1) Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains re-
dress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full
rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of torture, his
dependents shall be entitled to compensation. (2) Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the
victim or other persons to compensation which may exist under national law.
Torture Convention, supra note 115, art. 14. These provisions apply mutatis mutandis to acts of cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment: "the obligations contained in articles 10, 11, 12 and
13 shall apply with the substitution for references to torture of references to other forms of cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment." Id. art. 16.
HeinOnline  -- 42 Harv. Int'l L. J. 166 2001
2001 / In Defense of Civil Redress
remedies within their national courts151 for victims of violations of funda-
mental rights guaranteed by those instruments. 152
Although it could be argued that such provisions are applicable only
when it is the State Party that is responsible for the treaty violations, none of
these provisions specifically distinguishes between individuals who are
harmed within or without the territory of the particular state. 153 Rather, all
citizens 54 of a Contracting State are entitled to a remedy if a treaty creates
reciprocal access to courts of both states. The Torture Convention in par-
ticular emphasizes the importance of providing monetary compensation for
victims. 155 This grant of compensation must be a right; it is not sufficient
151. At the time of ratification, the United States adopted a reservation with respect to Article 14 of
the Torture Convention indicating "the understanding of the United States that article 14 requires a
State Party to provide a private right of action for damages only for acts of torture committed in territory
under the jurisdiction of that State Party" Multilateral Treaties, Deposited with the Secretary General:
Status as of 31 December 1992, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/18 (Vol. I), U.N. Sales No. E. 00.V.2 (2000).
This reservation indicates that the United States intended to provide a right of action for acts of torture
committed only in territory under U.S. jurisdiction. The legality of such reservations has been ques-
tioned. See William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: Is the UrntedStates Stilla Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 277 (1995). In any case, the passage of the
TVPA effectively nullifies this reservation as it provides a cause of action within U.S. courts for torture
committed overseas. See supra text accompanying note 47.
152. The American Convention, in pertinent part, states:
1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a compe-
tent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by
the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation
may have been committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties. 2. The States Par-
ties undertake: (a) to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have his rights determined
by the competent authority provided for by the legal system of the state; (b) to develop the possi-
bilities of judicial remedy; and (c) to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such reme-
dies when granted.
American Convention, supra note 128, art. 25. See also id. art. 8.1 ("Every person has the right to a hear-
ing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial
tribunal, previously established by law ... for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil,
labor, fiscal or any other nature.") (emphasis added); European Convention, supra note 136, art. 13.
153. See, e.g., American Convention, supra note 128, art. 1.1 ("The States Parties to this Convention
undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their
jurisdicton the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination .... ")
(emphasis added); ICCPR, supra note 148, art. 2(1). In fact, the travaux prparatoires of the ICCPR indi-
cate that the term "any person" in Article 2(3) encompasses "citizens, nationals, persons of foreign na-
tionality or stateless persons." MJ. BossuYT, GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX PRAPARATOIRES" OF THE IN-
TERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITIcAL RIGHTS 50 (1987). The U.S. reservation in this
regard, seesupra note 151, suggests that these provisions are open to multiple interpretations.
154. One U.S. court has explicitly interpreted the provisions of the ICCPR to grant citizens of States
Parties reciprocal access to the courts of other States Parties. See Kazi v. Dubai Petroleum Co., 961
S.W.2d 313, 316 (Tex. Ct. App. 1st Div. 1997) (citing with approval the affidavit of plaintiff's expert
witness, stating that "[w)here the covenant employs terms like 'everyone' or 'all persons,' it refers not
only to citizens of the State whose act or omission is at issue, but to all persons subject to its jurisdiction,
irrespective of their nationality," and that such a covenant "accords civil rights to 'everyone,' to 'all per-
sons' . , . but it grants political rights such as voting, election to office, and eligibility for public service
in one's own country only to 'every citizen,"' and holding that "the citizens of India are entitled ... 'to a
fair hearing by a competent independent and impartial tribunal established by law."'), aff'd by Dubai
Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W3d 71 (Tex.S.Ct.j. 2000).
155. See, e.g., Torture Convention, supra note 115, art. 14(1). The drafting history of the Torture Con-
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that compensation can be extended as an ex gratia gesture.156
To be sure, some of these treaties do not specifically require that victims
be granted access to an adversary process or to judicial review. In some cases
a compensation commission or other non-judicial body might be sufficient.
In many national systems, however, the judiciary represents the only forum
in which to bring such claims for compensation against those directly re-
sponsible. For example, in the United States, victims of human rights abuses
must seek civil redress and damages within federal or state courts, although
non-monetary administrative remedies are also available.
Further, many of these instruments specifically obligate signatories to as-
sert criminal jurisdiction over violators while providing that signatories
must also recognize the victim's "right to a remedy." In order to avoid su-
perfluity, the inclusion of both criminal and remedial duties suggests a
reading that these "right to a remedy" provisions refer to non-criminal en-
forcement mechanisms, such as civil redress.
Some interpretations of these human rights treaties have recognized the
duty of states to provide victims of violations with civil redress for the
harms that befell them. For example, in one noteworthy (though unique)
case, the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland recently acknowledged and
fulfilled obligations under the Torture Convention when it ordered the re-
lease of assets from Swiss banks in execution of the judgment obtained in
the Marcos litigation. 157 In so ruling, the Federal Supreme Court of Switzer-
land cited Article 14 of the Torture Convention for the proposition that
States Parties must
ensure that the victim of torture receives indemnification and has an ac-
tionable right to fair and reasonable compensation, including the means
for rehabilitation that is as complete as possible .... According to
these provisions [in the Torture Convention and other international
human rights treaties], victims of serious human rights violations are
entitled to compensation and to a fair trial, in which they can assert
their claims for compensation. 158
Additionally, the Inter-American Commission's and Inter-American Court's
opinions concerning the legality of national amnesty laws in Latin America
vention makes clear that the right to compensation should be as comprehensive as possible. J. HERMAN
BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTIONS AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK
ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT
OR PUNISHMENT 68 (1988). Moreover, delegations were adamant that "all other forms of claims for
compensation-with the exception of those of a purely personal nature-should be open to the victim's
heirs as successors." Id. This right of dependants to compensation is an "independent right intended to
compensate the loss that the dependents themselves have suffered." Id. at 147.
156. BURGERS & DANEUiUS, supra note 155, at 146.
157. In re Federal Office for Police Matters, 1A.87/1997/err, 7(c) and (dd) (Fed. Sup. Cc., Dec. 10,
1997) (Switz.).
158. Id. 7(bb) and (cc).
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that extinguish civil and criminal liability have decried the complete impu-
nity generated by such amnesties. For example, in Garay Hermosilla v.
Chile,159 the petitioners, all victims of human rights abuses perpetrated by
Chilean officials, asked the Inter-American Commission to declare that
Chile, by enacting a blanket amnesty, had violated Article 25 of the Inter-
American Convention, which provides that:
(1) Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other
effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection
against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the con-
stitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even
though such violation may have been committed by persons acting in
the course of their official duties. (2) The States Parties undertake: a. to
ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have his rights de-
termined by the competent authority provided for by the legal system
of the state; b. to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and c. to
ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when
granted. 60
The Inter-American Commission declared that in light of these rights,
Decree Law 2.191 was incompatible with the obligations of Chile under the
American Convention, including Articles 25, 1.1, and 8.1. The Inter-
American Commission advised that such amnesties deprive individuals of
"their right to due process for their just complaints against persons who had
committed excesses and acts of barbarism against them. ' ' 161 Further, the In-
ter-American Commission found that the national reparations provided to
the petitioners were insufficient to satisfy the obligations of the American
Convention, in part because they were not personalized and in part because
they deprived victims of other types of compensation. 162 The Inter-American
Commission also found that the work of the Chilean Truth Commission did
not replace the right to individualized redress, because under the terms of
the Truth Commission's mandate, it was unable to name or individually
sanction perpetrators. 163
D. The Limitations of Civil Suits
There are certainly limitations on the effectiveness of civil suits seeking
reparations on behalf of victims of human rights abuses. Unlike a criminal
case, where defendants may be detained, during the pendency of a civil suit
159. See Case 10.843, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 36196, OEA/ser. L./V/II.95, doc. 7, rev. 156, 10 (1997)
[hereinafter HrmffsIla].
160. American Convention, supra note 128, art. 25.
161. Hermotilla, supra note 159, 49.
162. See id. 74. The individual received "a single life-time pension in an amount no less than the
average compensation for a family in Chile." id. 57.
163. See id. 75.
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and beyond the defendant is not detained in any fashion, potentially raising
security concerns for the plaintiffs or flight risk. In fact, in many countries,
the defendant can even leave the country despite the filing of a suit or the
existence of a judgment against him. Thus, there is no guarantee that the
proceedings will be adversarial in nature, and the result may be a default
judgment for the plaintiff, thereby denying the plaintiff the opportunity to
face her adversary and to receive a clear articulation of the relevant law. Fur-
ther, to some, a civil judgment alone "may not carry the moral impact of a
criminal conviction, since tort actions are viewed as a response to a private
injury, rather than to an injury of concern to the whole community."l1l
Civil cases seeking to enforce human rights norms have resulted in mil-
lions of dollars in money judgments. 165 Historically, however, the full
benefit of any plaintiffs victory has been limited by the challenges of en-
forcement. In particular, the majority of defendants in these suits do not
hold assets in the country in which they are prosecuted, or they may secrete
their assets overseas during the pendency of the litigation. As a result, no
judgment stemming from cases seeking to enforce human rights norms in
the United States has ever been enforced, 166 with the exception of a paltry
sum retrieved from General Suarez-Mason of Argentina.167 These difficulties
are not unique to this class of litigation. 168 Indeed, outside of the ambit of
the Brussels/Lugano Conventions 169 money judgments can be difficult to
enforce overseas due to the lack of a universal judgment enforcement re-
gime. 70
164. Stephens, supra note 80, at 585. The "label 'tort' is a pale understatement when applied to the
horrors inflicted upon victims and survivors of human rights abuses." Id. at 603.
165. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 577 E Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (awarding damages in excess of
$10 million); Paul v. Avril, 901 E Supp. 330, 336 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (awarding damages of $41 million);
Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, No. 94 Civ. 3627, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4409, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8,
1996) (awarding damages exceeding $100 million); Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo, No. 1:90-CV-2010-GET,
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21158 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 10, 1993) affd, 72 E3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996) (awarding
$500,000 in compensatory and punitive damages); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 E Supp. 162, 197-98 (D.
Mass. 1995) (awarding $27.75 million to seven plaintift).
166. See Stavis, supra note 88, at 214.
167. See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 E. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 6, 1988), enforced, No. C-87-2058
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 1990). These funds were seized from General Suarez-Mason because he had directed a
foreign bank to make minimal deposits into a U.S. bank account. See STEPHENS & RATNHER, supra note 4,
at 218.
168. See generally Edward A. Amley, Jr., Note, Sue and Be Recognized. Collecting § 1350 Judgments
Abroad, 107 YALE L.J. 2177 (1998) (discussing the enforcement and recognition of foreign judgments);
Stavis, supra note 88, at 209 (discussing difficulties in collecting judgments) ("Ihe difficulty of enforc-
ing monetary judgments entered in almost all of these cases has hampered the expansion of this human
rights legal tool.").
169. See infra text accompanying notes 174-189.
170. Without such a regime, the enforcement of foreign judgments is largely a matter of comity and
reciprocity. See generally GARY BORN & GARY WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION (1996) (dis-
cussing the enforcement of foreign judgments); Amley, supra note 168 (discussing the enforcement and
recognition of foreign judgments).
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IV. THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS AND THE POTENTIAL THREAT TO HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION IN DOMESTIC COURTS
As discussed in this Part, certain developments in the area of private in-
ternational law could greatly improve the enforcement track record of do-
mestic actions-both criminal and civil-seeking reparations for the victims
of human rights abuses. The proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction
and the Enforcement of Civil Judgments ("the Hague Convention"), if it
enters into force, will create the foundation for an extensive enforcement
regime that will enable plaintiffs litigating in Contracting States to seek
enforcement of their civil judgments in any Contracting State in which the
defendant holds assets. This may come at a price, however. The proposed
Hague Convention may regulate the exercise of jurisdiction by national
courts in a way that affects cases seeking civil reparations for violations of
human rights norms. In particular, unless drafters adopt language exempt-
ing cases seeking to enforce human rights norms from the Hague Conven-
tion's jurisdictional regime, cases seeking civil damages brought on the basis
of extraterritorial jurisdiction may be foreclosed in the courts of states that
ratify the proposed Convention.
This Part discusses the background of the Hague Convention. It considers
the Brussels/Lugano regime on which the Hague Convention was loosely
based and from which some delegations have sought significant departures.
In particular, this Part describes the Hague Convention's proposed jurisdic-
tional framework with reference to the impact it could have on litigation
within domestic courts seeking to enforce human rights norms. Next, it
recounts significant events in the drafting history of the Hague Convention
leading up to the involvement of human rights advocates in the negotia-
tions. It suggests the inclusion in the Hague Convention of a special excep-
tion applying only to cases seeking to enforce international human rights
norms that would protect the right of victims to seek civil redress within
domestic courts without significantly altering the basic structure of the pro-
posed Hague Convention's jurisdictional regime.
A. Background to the Hague Convention Project
There is no global convention in force governing the recognition and en-
forcement' 7' of foreign judgments. In the 1960s, the Hague Conference on
Private International Law drafted a convention governing recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments, but it did not directly govern the exer-
171. Recognition of a judgment occurs when a court concludes that a certain matter has already been
decided and therefore need not be litigated further. In contrast, enforcement occurs when a parry is ac-
corded the relief that was awarded by the court issuing the judgment. A judgment must be recognized
before it is enforced. See Robert B. von Mehren & Michael E. Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign-Comntryjudgrnents in the United States, 6 LAw & Po'Y INT'L Bus. 37, 38 (1974).
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cise of jurisdiction.172 There are very few signatories, 7 3 and events within
the European Community eventually superseded this effort.
The Brussels Convention, as the Convention on Jurisdiction and the En-
forcement of Judgments in Civil Matters 174 is commonly known, was adopted
by delegations from the six original members of the European Economic
Community.'75 Unlike the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters ("the Recognition
Convention"), the Brussels Convention is a double convention with respect
to domicilliaries of Contracting States in that it governs both the exercise of
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments. 76
In keeping with continental notions of personal jurisdiction based on an
objective relationship between the defendant and the forum, the Brussels
Convention adopts the general rule that the defendant may be sued in the
jurisdiction in which he or she is domiciled or habitually resident, regardless
172. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters, Feb. 1, 1971, 1144 U.N.T.S. 249 [hereinafter Recognition Convention]. The United
States is not a party to this or any other bilateral or multilateral enforcement treaty. Peter Pfund, The
Project of the Hague Conference on Private International Law to Prepare a Convention on Jurisdiction and the Rec-
ognition/Enforement ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 7, 8 (1998). An
optional Supplementary Protocol to the 1971 Convention dealt with jurisdiction and obliged member
states to eschew recourse to certain bases of jurisdiction. See Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Feb. 1, 1971, Supplementary Proto-
col, 1144 U.N.T.S. 249, 271-72. However, the Supplementary Protocol's implementation was prohibi-
tively cumbersome, as it required the execution of separate bilateral agreements between and among the
states desiring to avail themselves of its provisions. See id. at 271.
173. Only the Netherlands, Portugal, and Cyprus have ratified the Recognition Convention. See
Hague Conference on Private International Law: Full Status Report Convention #16, Convention of 1
February 1971 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, available at http://www.hcch.net/elstatus/stat16e.html (last modified Jan. 15, 1999) (visited on
Nov. 16,2000).
174. The negotiation process began in 1959, and the Brussels Convention was eventually promul-
gated in 1968. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1978 O.J. (L 304) 78, reprinted in 8 1.L.M. 229 (1969) [hereinafter Brussels
Convention]. The companion Lugano Convention extends the provisions of the Brussels Convention to
the six member states of the European Free Trade Association (Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Swe-
den, and Switzerland) and is open to new members; however, new parties must negotiate accession trea-
ties with all other members. European Communities-European Free Trade Association, Convention on
Jurisdiction and Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J.
(L 319) 9, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 620 (1989). Other European states, including Spain and Portugal, later
acceded to the Brussels Convention.
175. The six original members of the European Economic Community were France, Germany, Italy,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Eric F. Hinton, Strengthening the Effectiveness of Community
Law: Direct Effect, Article 5 EC, and the European Court ofJustice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 307, 308
n.8 (1999).
176. See Arthur T. von Mehren, Enforcing Judgments Abroad: Reflections on the Design of Recognition Con-
ventions, 24 BROOK. J. INt'L L. 17, 17-18 (1998). A double convention governs both jurisdiction to
adjudicate and recognition of foreign judgments. Id. There are two variations of double conventions. In a
pure double convention, all jurisdictional bases that a state is not obliged by the convention to offer are
prohibited. Id. at 19. In contrast, in a mixed convention, there are three groups of jurisdictional bases:
first, required bases which the state must allow if the litigation falls within the scope of the convention;
second, permitted bases that the state may allow, but judgments rendered on such a basis are not entitled
to automatic enforcement under the convention; and third, prohibited bases that a state may not allow in
litigation that is within the scope of the convention. Id.
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of the defendant's nationality.177 Beyond this general rule, the Brussels Con-
vention adopts a series of claim-specific rules. For example, tort claims may
be brought in the jurisdiction in which the harmftil event occurred.'7 8 Thus,
the plaintiff suing a natural person in tort may exercise personal jurisdiction
according to two provisions of the Brussels Convention: the general rule of
domicile or the claim-specific rule of locus of harm.
The Brussels Convention has the effect of dividing jurisdiction into two
lists: a required (white) list and a prohibited (black) list with respect to
domiciliaries of Contracting States.'7 9 All Contracting Parties must make
available the bases of jurisdiction enumerated on the required list to all par-
ties who are litigating matters within the scope of the Brussels Convention.
Defendants who are domiciliaries of Contracting States may not be sued ex-
cept under bases enumerated under the Brussels Convention, even if those
bases exist under national law. Therefore, Contracting States may not allow
plaintiffs who are litigating matters within the scope of the Brussels Con-
vention against domiciliaries of another Contracting State to utilize these
prohibited bases of jurisdiction, even though they are otherwise permitted
under national law. Article 3 of the Brussels Convention sets forth an exem-
plary, not exhaustive, list of prohibited bases, and identifies provisions in the
national legal systems of Contracting States that constitute prohibited
bases.' 80 For example, Article 3(2) specifically prohibits the exercise of tran-
sient jurisdiction as it is practiced in Ireland and the United Kingdom. 181
The Brussels Convention is the first multilateral convention to regulate
both jurisdiction and enforcement. Under this system, the enforcing court
need not scrutinize the court of origin's jurisdictional basis, since the Brus-
sels Convention itself ensures that jurisdiction was proper before the court of
origin. Any judgment rendered by a Contracting State according to the
177. According to Article 2, "[s]ubject to the provisions of this Convention, persons domiciled in a
Contracting State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that State." Brussels Conven-
tion, supra note 174, art. 2. Article 52 leaves the definition of "domicile" to the state's local law. With
respect to legal persons, "domicile" is the seat of the corporation as defined by the private international
law of the forum state according to Article 53. Id. arts. 52-53.
178. According to this provision, a person domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued "in matters
relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred." Id.,
art. 5(3). The European Court of Justice has defined "tort" by what it is not. See Case 189/87, Kalfelis v.
Schroder, 1988 E.C.R. 5565, 5585 ("[Tlhe concept of 'matters relating to tort, delict and quasi-delict'
covers all actions which seek to establish the liability of a defendant and which are not related to a 'con-
tract' within the meaning of Article 5(1).").
179. See von Mehren, supra note 176, at 20-21. Thus, the Brussels Convention is a pure double con-
vention with respect to domicilliaries of Contracting States. See supra note 176.
180. "Exorbitant jurisdiction can be defined as those assertions of jurisdiction that are not generally
recognized by accepted principles of international law." John Fitzpatrick, The Lugano Convention and
Wstern European Integration: A Comparative Analysis ofJurisdiction andJudgments in Europe and the United
Stats, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 695, 703 n.34 (1993).
181. See Brussels Convention, supra note 174, art. 3(2). Similarly, the Brussels Convention forbids the
exercise of jurisdiction based solely on the nationality of the plaintiff as allowed under French law, CODE
CIVIL [C.Civ.] art. 14, and on the basis of the defendant's ownership of property within the forum as
allowed under German law, ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [civil procedure statute] § 23.
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Brussels Convention's jurisdictional rules is to be automatically enforced by
the courts of other Contracting States with no reference to the merits of the
case.182
The Brussels Convention does not regulate the exercise of jurisdiction
over domiciliaries of non-Contracting States. Rather, Article 4(1) of the
Brussels Convention preserves for Contracting States the use of exorbitant
grounds of jurisdiction against domiciliaries of non-Contracting States. At
the same time, such judgments must be recognized and enforced by other
Contracting States pursuant to Article 26. In other words, non-domiciliary
defendants may be sued under any jurisdictional basis and may have any
resultant judgment automatically enforced against them, but they do not
benefit from the Brussels Convention's jurisdictional regime or defenses to
enforcement as provided in Article 27. Thus, the Brussels Convention does
not concern itself with non-domiciliary defendants until the time of en-
forcement. This aspect of the Brussels Convention has been the subject of
indignant criticism.18 3
The Convention purports to provide a remedy for this asymmetry at Arti-
cle 59, which invites non-Contracting States to ratify bilateral conventions
on the recognition and enforcement of judgments with Contracting States.
In these bilateral agreements, Contracting States pledge not to enforce
judgments rendered on the basis of a jurisdictional rule on the Brussels Con-
vention's prohibited list. This remedy has proven illusory. For example, the
United States attempted to negotiate a bilateral enforcement treaty with the
United Kingdom, after the latter acceded to the Brussels Convention, in
order to prevent judgments rendered pursuant to Article 4 against U.S. par-
ties initiated in member states from being recognized and enforced in the
United Kingdom. The treaty negotiations failed in part due to the influence
of British insurance companies, who were fearful of U.S. jury verdicts, puni-
tive damage awards (particularly in products liability cases), and antitrust
remedies. 184
As a result of the widespread implementation of the Brussels Convention
regime, judgments against domiciliaries of Contracting States are freely en-
forced throughout Europe.185 In contrast, it is more difficult for litigants
outside the Brussels Convention ambit to enforce judgments abroad. 186 For
182. See Brussels Convention, supra note 174, art. 26 ("A judgment given in a Contracting State shall
be recognized in other Contracting States without any special procedure being required."); id. art. 29
("Under no circumstances may a foreign judgment be reviewed as to its substance.").
183. See, &g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 180, at 703 n.3 6 , 724 (describing the system as "blatantly dis-
criminatory" with a "significant negative impact on foreign parties doing-business in the EC," and not-
ing that the Convention has the effect of reinforcing "judgments based on exorbitant assertions of juris-
diction by guaranteeing their recognition and enforcement throughout Western Europe"); von Mehren,
supra note 176, at 23.
184. See Friedrich K. Juenger, A Hague Judgments Convention?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 111, 113, 120
(1998).
185. See id. at 116.
186. See LindaJ. Silberman & Andreas R Lowenfeld, A Different Challengefer the ALl: Herein of Foreign
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example, U.S. judgments may be difficult to enforce overseas, in part due to
the prevalence (or perception of the prevalence) of large jury awards con-
taining punitive or multiple damages. 187 In contrast, foreign judgments are
generally liberally enforced in the United States. 18 8 Although there is no
uniform enforcement regime in place within the United States due to con-
gressional inaction, judgments issuing from foreign tribunals are freely rec-
ognized and enforced either on principles of common law or pursuant to the
Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, which has been
adopted by approximately half of the states.189
The operation of the Brussels Convention has been quite successful in
Europe. The system is predictable and reliable, and the enforcement of for-
eign judgments occurs by operation of law without a de novo review of the
judgment and thus at only minimal judicial cost. 190 Over time, many states
lobbied for the creation of a more inclusive and worldwide enforcement re-
gime to replace the current patchwork approach, and the Hague Convention
project was born.
B. The Launching of the Hague Convention
The United States initiated the current Hague Convention project in May
1992 with a proposal to the Hague Conference on Private International
Law. '9 One commentator has noted the unequal negotiating positions of the
United States vis--vis the members of the Brussels Convention, notwith-
standing U.S. economic and diplomatic strength. 192 On the one hand, the
Coune, y.Judgments, an International Treaty, and an American Statute, 75 IND. .J. 635, 638-39 (2000).
187. SeeJuenger, supra note 184, at 114.
188. See Patrick J. Borchets, A Few Little Issues for the HagueJudgments Negotiations, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L
LAw 157, 157 (1998).
189. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 261-75 (1986 & Supp.
2000). Those states that have not adopted the Act generally apply its principles.
190. See Juenger, supra note 184, at 116.
191. See Ronald A. Brand, Tort Jurisdiction in a Multilateral Convention: The Lessons of the Due Process
Clause and the Brssels Convntion, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 125, 126 n.1 (1998). The formal negotiations
began in June 1997. Id. In November 1998, the drafting committee produced a preliminary consolidated
text that was on the table for negotiations in June 1999. See SPEcIM COMM'N ON INT'L JURISDICTION
AND THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIV. AND COM. MATTERS, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE
INT'L LAW, PROPOSAL BY THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE (Working Document No. 144E, Nov. 20, 1998)
[hereinafter Working Document No. 144E]. Because a number of key provisions remained bracketed
after the June 1999 proceedings, another negotiation session was added in October 1999 in preparation
for the final diplomatic conference that was originally to be held in October 2000. The October 1999
session produced a substantial draft text, but a number of issues remained outstanding for the final Dip-
lomatic Session, including the reach of exclusive jurisdiction, the treatment of default judgments, e-
commerce, intellectual property, reporting requirements, relations with other conventions, and the con-
tent of a human rights exception. See OCTOBER DAFT CONVENTION, supra note 3. On February 22,
2000, the U.S. delegation wrote to the Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private Interna-
tional Law and argued that there was not enough common ground in the preliminary text to warrant the
convening of a full Diplomatic Conference in October 2000. See Letter from Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant
Legal Advisor for Private International Law, U.S. Department of State, to J.H.A. van Loon (Feb. 22,
2000) (on file with the Harvard International LawJournal).
192. See Juenger, supra note 184, at 113.
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United States stands to gain significantly from the proposed Hague Conven-
tion. First, parties resident in the United States would gain protection from
assertions of jurisdiction based on Europe's exorbitant bases of jurisdiction.
Second, parties litigating in the United States would gain greater predict-
ability in enforcement, because they would have access to a more uniform
enforcement regime.
In contrast, parties litigating in Europe already benefit from a successful
enforcement regime among themselves. Given the already liberal enforce-
ment record for foreign judgments within the United States, the new Hague
Convention can only offer a marginal increase in assurance that foreign
judgments will be enforced here. 93 Thus, the main bargaining chip for the
United States is the relinquishment of forms of U.S. jurisdiction deemed
exorbitant from a continental perspective. These are principally transient (or
tag) jurisdiction and general doing-business jurisdiction, 194 both of which
have received constitutional blessing from U.S. courts and are particularly
important for civil human rights litigation. 195
Working Document 144E, an early consolidated draft text prepared by
the drafting committee for the June 1999 negotiations, 196 was loosely based
on the Brussels Convention model and envisioned a pure double convention
in which some bases of jurisdiction were required and all bases not required
were prohibited. Working Document 144E, like the Brussels Convention,
included a basic rule governing the exercise of general jurisdiction. Under
this rule, a natural person could be sued where the person was habitually
resident or domiciled, and legal persons could be sued in their place of in-
corporation or central management, or in their place of principal activity if
the other locations could not be determined. 197
193. Id. at 114.
194. See Eric B. Fastiff, The Proposed Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and
CommercialJudgments: A Solution to Butch Reynolds's Jurisdiction and Enforcement Problems, 28 CORNBLL INT'L
L.J. 469, 485 (1995) (noting that relinquishing tag jurisdiction "is the carrot which is enticing the
Europeans (and the Japanese and Canadians) to join the negotiations").
195. Despite initial support from the United States, observers increasingly question whether the
United States will sign and ratify the Hague Convention once it is opened for signature. See Letter from
Jeffrey Kovar, Assistant Legal Advisor for Private International Law, U.S. Department of State, to Alas-
dair Wallace, Head of International and Common Law Division, Lord Chancellor's Department, United
Kingdom (Sept. 19, 2000) (on file with the Harvard International Law Journal) (emphasizing that "[a]s a
general matter .. the U.S. delegation believes the October 1999 draft is not an effective vehicle for
achieving a conve. rion to which the United States can become a party." Kovar went on to note that
"[rWhe October 19! 9 draft presents a deal on jurisdiction that is heavily weighted against U.S. jurisdic-
tional practices. ""e Bar would reject it in this country."). However, even if the United States does not
immediately sign (r ratify the Hague Convention, the proposed amendments to the human rights excep-
tion remain impo st and appropriate, as they will ensure that other signatory states retain the ability to
provide victims of uman rights abuses with civil redress.
196. This text hOlds no official status. It was promulgated by the drafting committee to focus the ne-
gotiations. See Wor] ing Document No. 144E, supra note 191, note.
197. See id. art.
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Working Document 144E also recognized claim-specific bases for juris-
diction over contract and tort claims. 198 Echoing the general rule of the
Brussels Convention, Article 10 provided that,
[tihe plaintiff may commence an action based on a claim in tort or de-
lict in the courts of the Contracting State--(a) in which the act or omis-
sion of the defendant that caused the injury occurred, or (b) in which
the injury arose, provided that the defendant could reasonably foresee
that the activity giving rise to the claim could result in such injury in
that State .... 199
Finally, Working Document 144E provided for jurisdiction over a defendant
legal entity in the state in which a branch, agency, or other establishment of
the defendant was situated or had acted on behalf of the defendant as long as
the suit arose out of that activity.200
Article 20 of Working Document 144E outlined eight prohibited bases of
jurisdiction. Most importantly for litigation seeking to enforce human
rights norms, this prohibited list included jurisdiction premised on "(e) the
carrying on of commercial or other activities by the defendant within the
territory of the State; [and] (f) the service of a writ upon the defendant
within the territory of the State." 20 1 The original Hague Convention draft
was a pure double convention in that the prohibited list was exemplary,
rather than exhaustive, and every basis of jurisdiction not required was pro-
hibited.
Like the Brussels Convention, the enforcement provisions of Working
Document 144E were quite liberal. As a general rule it provided that "[a]
decision rendered in a Contracting State shall be recognised in another Con-
tracting State if it is final in the State of origin."20 2 At the same time, a court
was to decline recognition and enforcement if "the decision was rendered by
a court not having jurisdiction under this Convention. '" 20 3 The enforcing
court was not to undertake a review on the merits of the decision rendered
by the court of origin. 20 4
From the start of the negotiations, the United States advocated that the
Hague Convention be a mixed, rather than a pure double, convention. A
mixed convention envisions three categories20 5 of jurisdictional bases: a
198. See id. arts. 6-8, 10.
199. Id. art. 10.
200. See id. art. 9.
201. Id. art. 20. Article 20 also prohibited the exercise of general jurisdiction within a particular fo-
rum based on the presence of property in that forum, the nationality of either the plaintiff or defendant,
the domicile of the plaintiff, a unilateral specification of the forum by the plaintiff, and an assertion of
specific jurisdiction premised on transient jurisdiction or commercial activity. Id.
202. Id. art. 26.
203. Id. art. 27(1) (a).
204. See id. art. 27(3).
205. For an explanation of pure double and mixed conventions, see supra note 176.
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mandatory list, a prohibited list, and a permissive ("gray") list.206 The per-
missive list would comprise bases of jurisdiction existing in national law
that were neither mandatory nor prohibited. Litigants would be allowed to
utilize such bases against residents of Contracting States, but the enforce-
ment of the resultant judgment by the courts of other Contracting States
would be discretionary.
The United States argued that a mixed convention was necessary to avoid
preempting idiosyncratic jurisdictional rules and freezing permitted bases of
jurisdiction despite developments in business methods, technology, and
communications. 20 7 In a proposal submitted to the Special Commission on
International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters ("the Special Commission") during the June 1999 pro-
ceedings, the United States reproduced Article 20 with its list of prohibited
bases of jurisdiction, but included at Article 21 a residual provision to the
effect that "[tlhis Convention does not affect the status under the law of each
Contracting Party of rules of jurisdiction or competence neither required nor
prohibited by this Convention." 20 8 This proposal ensured that the list of
prohibited bases of jurisdiction was exhaustive, so that states could utilize
any basis of jurisdiction not expressly prohibited; the enforcement of judg-
ments on bases of jurisdiction not contained in the mandatory list, however,
would not be guaranteed. This position was ultimately adopted by the draft-
ers.
209
C. The Impact of the Original ProposedJurisdictional Rules on
Cases Seeking to Enforce Human Rights Norms
As originally drafted, the jurisdictional rules contained in Working
Document 144E threatened to hinder the ability of victims of human rights
abuses to obtain civil reparations through strictly civil proceedings in com-
mon law jurisdictions or through civil actions in the context of criminal
prosecutions in civil law jurisdictions.2 10 Assuming the Hague Convention
206. See, ag., Letter from Peter Pfund, Special Advisor on Private International Law, U.S. Department
of State, to Hague Conference participants (May 18, 1999) (on file with the Harvard International Law
Journal) (arguing that "we do not think it is possible to complete a successful convention without this
'grey area."'); SPECIAL COMM'N ON INT'L JURISDICTION AND THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN
CIV. AND COM. MATTERS, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, PROPOSAL BY THE DELEGATION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Working Document No. 150E, June 7, 1999) [hereinafter Working
Document 150E); SPECIAL COMM'N ON INT'L JURISDICTION AND THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDG-
MENTS IN CIV. AND COM. MATTERS, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L LAw, REPORT OF MEETING No.
53 (Nov. 20, 1998) (describing the U.S. presentation arguing for a mixed convention).
207. See, e.g., Jeffrey Kovar, Remarks at the American Society of International Law Conference (Mar.
26, 1999) (summary of address on file with the Harvard International Law Journal). Jeffrey Kovar is the
head of the U.S. delegation to the Hague Conference.
208. Working Document No. 150E, supra note 206.
209. See infra text accompanying note 227.
210. It is important to emphasize that this threat appears to have been inadvertent. PETER NYGH &
FAUSTO POCAR, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INTL LAw, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMM'N 80 (Prelimi-
nary Document No. 11), available at http://www.hcch.netle/workprog/jdgm.html (n.d., visited on Nov.
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had proceeded as a pure double convention, in which all bases of jurisdiction
were either mandatory or prohibited, victims of human rights abuses would
have been permitted to obtain civil redress from responsible persons in only
two fora: the forum in which the violator resided, as provided by Article 3,
or the forum wherein the tort occurred, as provided by Article 10. In the
human rights context, these fora are often the same, so it is likely that in
reality only one forum would be available. This is often a forum that is un-
willing or unable to entertain suits by human rights victims.
If victims had sought to file suit against a resident of a Contracting State
in common law systems, the original jurisdictional rules would have pro-
hibited recourse by victims of human rights abuses to either transient or
doing-business jurisdiction. Specifically, an individual who was victimized
in Country A by a resident of Country A and who was in exile in, or had
access to the courts of, Country B would have been prohibited from seeking
civil reparations in the courts of Country B if both Country A and Country
B were parties to the Hague Convention and the potential defendant trav-
eled to or maintained significant contacts in Country B. Rather, the victim
would have had to return to Country A in order to seek civil redress.
Similarly, in the civil law context, victims of human rights abuses could
have been prohibited from seeking reparations within the context of crimi-
nal trials initiated in Contracting States against non-resident defendants on
the basis of extraterritorial forms of jurisdiction. 211 Because Working
Document 144E did not authorize the exercise of jurisdiction over non-
residents, courts could have interpreted attempts to add civil claims to
criminal prosecutions brought under universal or passive personality juris-
diction as transgressions of the jurisdictional provisions of the Hague Con-
vention. In this scenario, the criminal court would have power over the de-
fendant by virtue of universal or passive personality jurisdiction-both ex-
traordinary bases of jurisdiction. Even if such a claim for reparations were
permitted ex ante as a supplementary form of criminal jurisdiction, the en-
forcing court could have denied enforcement of any civil judgment, as the
basis of civil jurisdiction was not mandatory under the Hague Convention,
13, 2000) (hereinafter Preliminary Document No. 11] (noting that "the chief aim of the Convention is
not to regulate civil actions of this kind [human rights actions], but rather to define the rules of jurisdic-
tion for civil and commercial relations among individuals within an international setting."). Once dele-
gations recognized the potential impact of the proposed jurisdictional rules on civil cases seeking to
enforce human rights norms, they for the most part appeared committed to devising a remedy, although
there has been significant disagreement on the form and scope thereof.
211. Although this is not express from the terms of the Hague Convention, it is expected that the
Hague Convention's enforcement provisions would apply to all judgments providing for civil remedies,
regardless of the nature of the court or proceedings producing the judgment, as is the case with respect to
the Brussels Convention. See id. at 80 (noting that "[r]here is a well known tendency with these interna-
tional crimes to assign universal jurisdiction to States .... Thus, it is only to be expected that criminal
proceedings may be accompanied by civil proceedings instituted by victims to obtain relief from the
person responsible for the violation," and that "a civil action of this kind may be taken in the context of
the criminal action itself').
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and the civil judgment ultimately was rooted in an extraordinary basis of
jurisdiction more akin to the prohibited bases of jurisdiction.
If the Hague Convention had been drafted as a mixed convention without
specific accommodation for human rights litigation, the most important
forms of jurisdiction utilized by victims of human rights abuses in common
law jurisdictions would have still been foreclosed by operation of Article 20.
According to Working Documents 144E and 150E, the U.S. proposal, tran-
sient and doing-business jurisdiction remained on Article 20's prohibited
list of jurisdictional bases.
Working Document 144E's jurisdictional provisions did not reflect the
fact that in certain circumstances, cases seeking to enforce human rights
norms simply must be brought before national courts outside of the state in
which the harm occurred, as redress would be impossible in the jurisdiction
in which the harm occurred. Historically, most cases brought under the
ATCA and the TVPA in U.S. courts would not have been possible in the
jurisdiction in which the harm occurred. 212 These grave international law
violations often occur in states experiencing political upheaval or governed
by authorities who are themselves responsible for or complicit in such viola-
tions. 213 As such, domestic courts in these states may be unable or unwilling
to proceed effectively against perpetrators or to provide victims with re-
dress. 214
For example, in Filartiga, the plaintiffs demonstrated that victims, law-
yers, and judges involved in lawsuits against Paraguay's security forces had
been threatened and killed, and efforts to prosecute offenders were routinely
sabotaged. 215 Similarly, the plaintiffs in a case against Jean Bosco Barayag-
212. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 577 E Supp. 860, 861-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (suit for torture and
summary execution committed in Paraguay); Todd v. Panjaitan, 1994 WL 827111 (D. Mass. 1994) (suit
for summary execution committed in East Timor); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 169-71, 179,
189 (D. Mass. 1995) (suit for summary execution, disappearance, torture, arbitrary detention and cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment committed in Guatemala); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789,
790-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (class action suit for torture, summary execution, disappearance and arbitrary
detention committed in the Philippines); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 E3d 844, 846-47 (11th Cir. 1996)
(suit for torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment committed in Ethiopia).
213. See, e.g., Paul v. Avril, 901 E Supp. 330, 330-35 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (suit against former head of
Haitian military); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 E Supp. 1189, 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (suit against
Assasie-Gyimah, Commander of the Ghanaian Navy and Deputy Chief of National Security); In re Estate
of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 E2d 493, 495 (9th Cir. 1992) (suit against former
president of the Philippines); Kadi6 v. Karadzk, 70 E3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995) (suit against political
leader of self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb entity).
214. This unfortunate reality was one of the motivating factors underlying the passage of the TVPA
in the United States. See H.R. REp. No. 249, pt. 1 (1991). There, it was noted that "[jiudical protec-
tions against flagrant human rights violations are often least effective in those countries where such
abuses are most prevalent." Id. at 3. As a result,
[a] state that practices torture and summary execution is not one that adheres to the rule of law. The
general collapse of democratic institutions characteristic of countries scourged by massive violations
of fundamental rights rarely leaves the judiciary intact .... The Torture Victim Protection Act ...
would respond to this situation.
Id. at 3.
215. See Filartiga, 630 E2d at 878 (noting that plaintiff's Paraguayan attorney was arrested, threat-
HeinOnline  -- 42 Harv. Int'l L. J. 180 2001
2001 / In Defense of Civil Redress
wiza, the leader of a Hutu political party in Rwanda, demonstrated that the
Rwandan judicial system was virtually inoperative and thus unable to proc-
ess civil claims. 216 Human rights violators are often protected from suit in
the states in which they act, either because they are agents of the state or
because the state condones, is complicit in, indifferent to, or otherwise pow-
erless in the face of, human rights abuses in its territory. Such perpetrators
may even benefit from a blanket amnesty in the state in which the harm
occurred, which may expressly or implicitly foreclose civil redress. 217 Perpe-
trators of human rights violations may also dodge apprehension by the
courts of their own country by fleeing to another jurisdiction.218
Many cases seeking to enforce human rights norms have been brought by
individuals who have had to flee the state in which the harm occurred,
thereby making it extremely difficult for them to return to that state in or-
der to pursue their rightful claims. Such plaintiffs may even be refugees, as
defined by the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 219 ("the
Refugee Convention"), who have sought a safe haven in a foreign country
because they are targeted for persecution at home.220 To force these individu-
als to seek redress in the country from which they have fled is unjust and
contrary to the spirit of the Refugee Convention. A central feature of the
Refugee Convention and of international refugee law in general is the prin-
ciple of non-refoulement, which prohibits states from sending refugees back to
a territory in which their life or freedom would be threatened.221 Alterna-
ened with death and subsequently disbarred). The difficulty of pursuing human rights claims domesti-
cally has been noted by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. See, e.g., Velasquez Rodriguez
Case, supra note 134, at 319-20 (noting the inefficacy of the domestic system in Honduras).
216. See Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, No. 94 Civ. 3627, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4409 (S.D.N.Y Apr.
8, 1996).
217. For example, prior to relinquishing power in Chile, members of General Pinocher's junta negoti-
ated a self-amnesty, effectively insulating themselves from any liability for their actions. See Decree-Law
No. 2.191, Diario Oficial No. 30.042 (Apr. 19, 1978) (Chile) stating that ("talmnesty is granted to all
persons who, as authors, accomplices or accessories, committed crimes during the period of the State of
Siege, comprised between September 11, 1973 and Mar. 10, 1978"); Garay Hermosilla v. Chile, Case
10.843, Report No. 36.96, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.LIVIII.95, doc. 7 rev. at 9, 66 (1997) (not-
ing that the Chilean amnesty law rendered the right to compensation "illusory" and "judicially impossi-
ble").
218. See, e.g., Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 E2d at 495 (suit against daughter of Ferdinand
Marcus after she was forced into exile in the United States); Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 E Supp.
3 (D.D.C. 1998) (defendant fled Algeria to the United States).
219. Article IA(2) defines "refugee" as any person who,
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is un-
able or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country ....
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. 137,
152 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; see also United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
220. See, e.g., Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, No. 98-CV-2470 (N.D.
Ga. Dec. 14, 1998) (plaintiffs were all refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina residing in the United
States, Belgium, and Germany).
221. See Refugee Convention, supra note 219, art. 33(1) ("No Contracting State shall expel or return.
a refugee... to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of
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tively, victims of human rights abuses may be granted political asylum 2 2 2 in
their host state upon a showing that the petitioner possesses a credible fear
of persecution.223 Even if such victims are not refugees or asylum seekers, it
still may be difficult or impossible for them to return to the state in which
the harm occurred. They may be in voluntary or forced exile, or have simply
moved on and resettled abroad.
Given these unfortunate realities, it is often impossible for victims of hu-
man rights abuses to obtain legal redress in the courts of the state in which
the defendant resides or the harm occurred. It is imperative that victims
have access to the courts of any country where the alleged perpetrator can be
found. If the Hague Convention were to require national courts to dismiss
claims to reparations for human rights violations committed abroad by non-
residents, it would perpetrate further injustices on victims already trauma-
tized by gross human rights violations committed against them.
V. THE INCLUSION OF AN EXCEPTION FOR HuMAN RIGHTS CASES IN THE
DRAFT TEXT OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION
Prior to the June 1999 proceedings of the Hague Conference, human
rights advocates became aware of the implications of the proposed Hague
Convention's jurisdictional provisions that would limit human rights en-
forcement through civil redress. 224 A number of concerned groups and indi-
viduals formed a Human Rights Coalition ("the Coalition") to participate in
the drafting process and lobby delegations to include language excluding
cases seeking to enforce human rights norms from the more restrictive as-
pects of the Hague Convention's jurisdictional regime. 225 This Part describes
the Coalition's contribution to the negotiations. It then recounts the debates
his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion."). This princi-
ple also finds expression in Article 3 of the Torture Convention. Torture Convention, supra note 115, art.
3 ("No State Party shall expel, return ... or extradite a person to another State where there are substan-
tial grounds fbr believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.").
222. See, e.g., Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 E Supp. 1189, 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Ghanaian plaintiff
had been granted political asylum in the United States); id. at 1199 (noting that the plaintiff "would be
putting himself in grave danger were he to return to Ghana to prosecute this action"); Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 E Supp. 162, 169 (D. Mass. 1995) (Guatemalan plaintiffs had applied for political asylum
in the United States); Filartiga v. Pefla-Irala, 577 R Supp. 860, 864 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (Paraguayan plain-
tiffsought asylum in the United States during the pendency of her suit).
223. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(42) (A) (1994); United States Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (holding that an alien who shows a well-founded fear of prosecu-
tion is eligible to be considered for asylum).
224. As a result of a presentation by Professor Paul Dubinsky of New York Law School, delegations
first discussed the potential threat to civil suits enforcing human rights during the Mar. and Nov. 1998
drafting sessions, but no specific language was crafted. See SPECIAL COMM'N ON THE QUESTION OF JU-
RISDICTION, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE
INT'L LAW, REPORT OF MEETING No. 47, at 2 (Nov. 17, 1998).
225. The Coalition consists of academics, practitioners, and representatives from non-governmental
organizations, such as Amnesty International, The Center for Justice & Accountability, F6dration Inter-
nationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme, Human Rights Watch, the International Association of
Democratic Lawyers, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, and Redress Trust.
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over the human rights exception that resulted in the draft text that will
serve as the basis for future negotiations.
A. The Drafting History of the Human Rights Exception
Members of the Coalition officially participated in the June and October
1999 negotiation sessions of the Hague Conference. At the June session, the
Special Commission provisionally adopted a draft text in preparation for a
final diplomatic conference, originally to be held in 2000 ("the June Draft
Convention"). 226 At the June session, it appeared that the U.S. position had
prevailed and the Hague Convention would be a mixed, rather than pure
double, convention. 227 In other words, the Hague Convention envisioned
three categories of jurisdictional bases: those that were mandatory, or white
(i.e., all signatories must make these bases available to litigants), those that
were prohibited, or black (i.e., such bases could not be invoked in relation to
residents of signatory countries), and those that were permissive, or gray, but
for which enforcement would be discretionary.
The June Draft Convention maintained the prohibition of tag jurisdic-
tion228 and jurisdiction on the basis of "the carrying on of commercial or
other activities by the defendant in that State. '229 However, the Coalition
succeeded in effectuating the insertion of a bracketed placeholder in Article
20(3) based on a proposal by the Netherlands and Japan. 230 The placeholder
reads, "Nothing in this article shall prevent a party from bringing an action
under national law based on a violation of human rights [to be defined]. 231
Members of the Coalition had suggested that the Hague Convention contain
a separate provision setting forth jurisdictional rules unique to human rights
litigation along the lines of the provisions governing suits involving con-
tracts with consumers or trusts. However, state delegations insisted that
226. See HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, PRELIMINARY DRAFT CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION
AND THE EFFECTS OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS, adopted provisionally by the
SpmWa Commission, June 18, 1999 (on file with the Harvard International Law Journal) [hereinafter JUNE
DRAFr CONVENTION].
227. Se id. art. 19 (providing that "subject to Articles 4 [choice of court], 5 [appearance by the de-
fendant], 7 [contracts concluded by consumers], 8 [employment contracts], 13 [exclusive jurisdiction]
and [14] [provisional and protective measures], the Convention does not prevent the application by
Contracting States of rules of jurisdiction under national law, provided that this is not prohibited under
Article 20") (brackets surrounding 14 in original).
228. Sm id. ar. 20. ("Jurisdiction shall not be exercised ... on the basis solely of one or more of the
following-(i) the temporary residence or presence of the defendant in that State . .
229. Id.
230. See SPECIAL COMM'N ON INT'L JURISDICTION AND THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ON
CI. AND COM. MATTERS, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, PROPOSAL BY THE DELEGATIONS OF
THE NETHERLANDS AND JAPAN (Working Document No. 200 E+F, June 12, 1999).
231. JUNE DRAFT CONVENTION, supra note 226. During the June proceedings, a number of state and
non-governmental delegations-including those of Canada, Slovakia, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
the United States, the European Commission, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the Inter-
national Association of Democratic Lawyers, the International Bar Association, and the International Law
Association-participated in a "Human Rights Working Group" to discuss language to exempt litiga-
tion enfbrcing human rights norms from the prohibited list of jurisdictional bases.
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such litigation be addressed instead through a general exception to Article
20 at least preliminarily.232 Further, Australia suggested that human rights
litigation be excluded from the Hague Convention. 233
The human rights exception language in the June Draft Convention was
the subject of considerable debate in both formal and informal sessions dur-
ing the October 1999 inter-sessional proceedings. The debate began with
the consensus submission from the Coalition. This submission proposed the
insertion of the following language in Article 20:
Nothing in this Article shall prevent a party from bringing an action in
a national court seeking relief for a violation of international human
rights or international humanitarian law that amounts to criminal con-
duct under either international or national law, or for which a right to
reparation is established under either international law or national law.
International law shall be interpreted with reference to the sources of
international law identified in Article 38 of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. 234
In the ensuing debate, 23' once the impact of the proposed Hague Conven-
tion on cases seeking to enforce human rights norms became clear, some
state delegations indicated support for language protecting such cases in
principle. At the same time, some resistance to the authorization of any form
of transient jurisdiction was apparent on the part of other delegations. One
delegation particularly opposed the inclusion of any reference to human
rights in the Hague Convention, arguing that the Hague Convention was
designed to address commercial disputes, as opposed to issues of public in-
ternational law. One delegation argued that if there were such an exception,
it should also apply to other international crimes, such as hijacking and ter-
rorism. 236
232. For a summary of discussion of the human rights exception during the June 1999 proceedings,
see SPECIAL COMM'N ON INT'L JURISDICTION AND THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIV. AND
COM. MATTERS, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, REPORT OF MEETING No. 64, at 2 (June 14,
1999).
233. See SPECIAL COMM'N ON INT'L JURISDICTION AND THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN
CIV. AND COM. MATTERS, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw, PROPOSAL BY THE DELE-
GATION OF AUSTRALIA. (Working Document No. 199 E+F, June 12, 1999). However, delegations ulti-
mately "rejected this solution, as the consequence would have been that these proceedings, and the
judgments handed down as a result, could not have been covered by the Convention's rules of recognition
and enforcement although they would have been based on a rule of jurisdiction admitted by the Conven-
tion itself." Preliminary Document No. 11, supra note 210, at 80.
234. See SPECIAL COMM'N ON INT'L JURISDICTION AND THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN
CIV. AND COM. MATTERS, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, REPORT OF MEETING No. 75, at 2-3
(Oct. 27, 1999) (presentation and discussion of Working Document No. 242); REPORT OF MEETING
No. 75: CORRIGENDUM (Oct. 30, 1999). For a discussion of the considerations guiding the drafting of
this proposal, see COALITION ON JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGmENTS, supra note 8.
235. The discussion of the deliberations is drawn in part from correspondence with members of the
Coalition who were in attendance. The author is particularly indebted to Helen Duffy for her exhaustive
reporting during the October session.
236. See SPECIAL CoMm'N ON INT'L JURISDICTION AND THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN
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To channel the debate, the Working Group of state delegations convened
at the outset of the October meeting and drafted the following alternative
language:
Nothing in this article shall prevent a court in a Contracting State from
exercising jurisdiction [under national law] in an action seeking relief
for a violation of international human rights or international humani-
tarian law [which constitutes a crime under international law]
a) if such violation amounts to genocide, a crime against humanity or a
war crime;
[[and)[orl
b) if the party seeking relief is exposed to a risk of a denial of justice be-
cause proceedings in another State are not possible or cannot reasonably
be required. 237
According to this language, sub-section (a) would have provided that only
suits involving claims of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes
would have benefited from the exception to Article 20's prohibitions. Ac-
cordingly, the victim of an act of torture that did not constitute a crime
against humanity (i.e., if the torture was not undertaken within the context
of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population)238 would
be precluded from utilizing any of the bases of jurisdiction included in the
prohibited list. Sub-section (a) prompted a protracted debate over whether
the exception should include an enumeration of tortious acts as opposed to a
non-exhaustive or illustrative list.
Sub-section (b) remained controversial within the Working Group, as
delegations could not agree on whether proof that the plaintiff would suffer
a denial of justice should be a requirement for all cases benefiting from the
exception to Article 20, or whether such a denial of justice should provide
an alternative trigger mechanism for the exception, regardless of the par-
ticular violation alleged. One delegation insisted that the denial of justice
element was essential to justify the assertion of an otherwise exorbitant basis
of jurisdiction. Other delegations expressed concern that victims of human
rights violations would forum shop for the most receptive forum in which to
bring their claims. In response, other delegations, namely those from non-
governmental organizations, raised the practical problems of requiring hu-
man rights victims to surmount this hurdle and prove that justice was unob-
tainable elsewhere. 239
CIV. AND COM. MATTERS, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, REPORT OF MEETING No. 75, at 2-3
(Oct. 27, 1999).
237. See SPECIAL. COMM'N ON INT'L JURISDICTION AND THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN
CIV. AND COM. MATTERS, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, PROPOSAL BY THE HUMAN RIGHTS
WORKING GROUP (Working Document No. 264 E+F, Oct. 26, 1999).
238. See, e.g., Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 97, art. 5.
239. See SPECIAL COMM'N ON INT'L JURISDICTION AND THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN
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Had the "and" been adopted between sub-section (a) and (b), the Hague
Convention would have severely limited the ability of human rights victims
to seek redress, not only because the plaintiff would have been limited to
claims of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, but also because
she would have been required to prove that she was precluded from seeking
justice in any other state. Conversely, had the "or" formulation been
adopted, the Hague Convention would have provided little guidance to na-
tional courts in determining the precise circumstances in which civil plain-
tiffs would be permitted to utilize the otherwise prohibited bases of jurisdic-
tion. This shortcoming would have been alleviated somewhat had the brack-
eted language of the chapeau, limiting the availability of prohibited bases of
jurisdiction to violations of human rights or humanitarian law that rose to
the level of criminal conduct under international law, been adopted.
During the negotiations, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, the
United Kingdom, and the International Association of Democratic Lawyers
produced a joint proposal ("the Joint Proposal") that referred specifically to
international crimes as defined in the statute of the International Criminal
Court ("the ICC Statute"). This proposal read:
Nothing in this article shall prevent a court in a Contracting State from
exercising jurisdiction under national law in an action seeking relief in
respect of conduct which constitutes either-
a) genocide, a crime against humanity or war crime, as defined in the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; or
b) a serious crime against a natural person under international law.240
This language reflected debates over whether the Hague Convention should
permit the utilization of otherwise prohibited bases of jurisdiction only
where the plaintiff alleged the violation of a norm contained within a
specific treaty, such as the Torture Convention. Over the course of the de-
bates, certain delegations advocated an enumeration of treaties to guide na-
tional courts in applying the exemption. Others countered that listing trea-
ties might create ambiguities with respect to plaintiffs suing within states
that had not ratified the particular treaty in question. 241
CIV. AND COM. MATTERS, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, REPORT OF MEETING No. 76, at I
(Oct. 27, 1999); SPECIAL COMM'N ON INT'I JURISDICTION AND THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
IN C1V. AND COM. MATTERS, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, REPORT OF MEETING No. 80, at 5
(Oct. 30, 1999) [hereinafter REPORT OF MEETING No. 80) (discussing proposed denial of justice provi-
sion).
240. See SPECIAL COMM'N ON INT'L JURISDICTION AND THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN
CIV. AND COM. MATTERS, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, PROPOSAL BY THE DELEGATIONS OF
JAPAN, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, SWEDEN AND THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL ASS'N OF DEMOCRATIC LAWYERS (Working Document No. 277, Oct. 26, 1999).
See REPORT OF MEETING No. 80, supra note 239, at 4-5 (discussing the proposal).
241. See generally REPORT OF MEETING NO. 80, supra note 239, at 5.
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The Joint Proposal would have allowed the plaintiff to utilize an other-
wise prohibited basis of jurisdiction so long as his claims were for one of the
three listed crimes as they are defined within the Statute of the International
Criminal Court. Alternatively, the otherwise prohibited bases of jurisdiction
would be available to a civil plaintiff alleging conduct that rose to the level
of a "serious crime" under international law. This latter prong would likely
have included the crimes of terrorism, drug-trafficking or hijacking; acts of
torture, arbitrary detention, slavery, and disappearances that did not other-
wise constitute crimes against humanity; or war crimes that fell outside of
the ICC Statute. In this regard, sub-section (b) was a welcome development,
as it would have provided for the potential evolution and expansion of norms
triggering the exception. One delegation argued, however, that the notion of
a "serious crime" should encompass only those acts involving physical vio-
lence, which would have excluded forms of psychological torture and, ar-
guably, acts of disappearances or slavery that did not involve physical harm.
Under this interpretation, a plaintiff who suffered psychological torture
would not be able to utilize the prohibited bases of jurisdiction, even
though the Torture Convention prohibits acts of mental and physical torture
equally.
The Chinese delegation introduced a proposal ("the Chinese Proposal") for
Article 20(4) that read:
Nothing in this article shall prevent a court in a Contracting State from
exercising jurisdiction under national law in an action claiming civil
compensatory damages for death or serious bodily injury arising from a
serious crime under international law, provided that that State has es-
tablished its criminal jurisdiction over that crime in accordance with an
international treaty to which it is a party.242
This language reflected the delegation's prior position that international
crimes, in addition to human rights crimes, should trigger an exception
from the Hague Convention's jurisdictional prohibitions. 243
Other delegations argued that the jurisdictional exception for interna-
tional crimes should be triggered by violations of customary international
law and of treaty law, since not every state has enacted implementing legis-
lation for the treaties they have signed. Further, it was unclear from the
Chinese Proposal whether the otherwise prohibited bases of jurisdiction
would be available only where the state had established criminal jurisdiction
over the crime in question, or whether it was sufficient that the state had the
legal power to exercise such criminal jurisdiction over crimes of that nature.
242. See SPECIAL COMM'N ON INT'L JURISDICTION AND THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN
CIV AND COM. MATTERS, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L LAw, PROPOSAL BY THE DELEGATION OF
CHINA (Working Document No. 278, Oct. 26, 1999). See also REPORT OF MEETING No. 80, supra note
239, at 4 (discussing the Chinese Proposal).
243. See REPORT OF MEETING No. 80, supra note 239, at 4.
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If the former were the case, victims of international crimes would be de-
pendent on state officials to commence criminal prosecutions before they
could seek civil reparations. The Chinese Proposal also would have limited
access to otherwise prohibited bases of jurisdiction for claims of serious bod-
ily injury or death, thus excluding acts involving significant deprivations of
liberty without bodily harm or acts of psychological torture.244
From the various proposals advanced, the Drafting Committee generated
a consolidated text that will serve as the basis for the final negotiations. This
text appears in two variants. The first is a variant of the Joint Proposal and
the second reproduces the Chinese Proposal. The text reads:
18(3) Nothing in this Article shall prevent a court in a Contracting
State from exercising jurisdiction under national law in an action
[seeking reliefO[claiming damages] in respect of conduct which consti-
tutes-
[Variant One:
[a) genocide, a crime against humanity or a war crime(, as defined in
the Statute of the International Criminal Court]; or]
[b) a serious crime against a natural person under international law; or]
[c) a grave violation against a natural person of non-derogable funda-
mental rights established under international law, such as torture, slav-
ery, forced labour and disappeared persons].
[Sub paragraphs [b) and] c) above apply only if the party seeking relief
is exposed to a risk of a denial of justice because proceedings in another
state are not possible or cannot reasonably be required.]
Variant Two:
a serious crime under international law, provided that this State has es-
tablished its criminal jurisdiction over that crime in accordance with an
international treaty to which it is a party and that the claim is for civil
compensatory damages for death or serious bodily injury arising from
that crime.] 245
The brackets in the chapeau indicate disagreement among delegations as
to whether the otherwise prohibited bases of jurisdiction would be available
to plaintiffs seeking relief other than money damages, such as injunctive
relief. All three sub-sections of Variant One are bracketed, which implies
that any one may exist alone or in conjunction with any other sub-section.
Variant One reveals further disagreement as to whether the denial of justice
requirement should apply to plaintiffs seeking relief for "serious crimes"
244. See id. at 5.
245. OCTOBER DRAFT CONVaE1MON, supra note 3, art. 18(3). Many of the provisions were renum-
bered in the final draft, so that the prohibited bases of jurisdiction now appear in Article 18.
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under international law or only to plaintiffs seeking relief for "grave viola-
tions ... of non-derogable fundamental rights," notwithstanding that there
is likely to be considerable overlap of acts in each category. At this point, the
entire provision is unbracketed, which is welcome in that it implies that a
human rights exception will be included within the final text. Theoretically,
however, the issue of whether there should be a human rights exception at
all could still be reopened in subsequent negotiations. 246
B. An Evaluation of the October Draft Convention
In the last negotiating session, Hague Conference members made consid-
erable progress toward drafting language that would exempt litigation
seeking to enforce international human rights norms from the more restric-
tive jurisdictional rules of the proposed Hague Convention. The text still
contains some pronounced deficiencies, however.
The otherwise prohibited bases of jurisdiction should be available to vic-
tims of human rights violations seeking forms of relief other than money
damages. 247 The jurisdictional rules of the Hague Convention will undoubt-
edly cover forms of provisional relief, such as injunctive relief. The term "re-
lief" in the first bracketed option of Article 18(3) should be adopted and
interpreted to encompass a variety of remedies available at various stages of a
proceeding, including reparations, monetary compensation, restitution, and
forms of equitable relief such as injunctions.
Article 18(3) should not include an exclusive list of acts whose perpetra-
tion will trigger the exception. Instead, the exception should identify a
category of norms or an open-ended and exemplary list of norms that sup-
port the exercise of civil universal jurisdiction. The Hague Convention
should remain flexible to address new forms of human rights abuses and al-
low for the evolution of international law. Since the Second World War, in-
ternational law has witnessed a proliferation of new norms that have as their
central concern the protection of the individual from violence and abuse.
The laws of war alone have evolved considerably in the last few years as a
result of the work of the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals 248 and
the drafting of the ICC Statute.249 In this respect, sub-section (a) of Variant
One is acceptable only in conjunction with sub-sections (b) and (c) of Vari-
ant One, which remain open-ended and exemplary.250 For the same reasons,
246. In the most recent report of the negotiations, the rapporteurs noted that Article 18(3) was de-
signed to enable states to be free to adopt jurisdictional rules governing human rights actions seeking
civil remedies, given states' obligations from general and treaty law. Article 18 thus provides an excep-
tion to the prohibition against using certain fora to obtain relief or damages following a serious violation
of fundamental human rights. Preliminary Document No. 11, supra note 210, at 82-83.
247. See OCTOBER DRAFT CONVENTION, supra note 3, art. 13 (providing that a court with jurisdic-
tion over the merits of a dispute has jurisdiction to order any provisional or protective measures).
248. See Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 97; Rwanda Statute, supra note 98.
249. See ICC Statute, supra note 99, art. 8 (enumerating war crimes subject to ICC jurisdiction).
250. The commentary on the current draft suggests that both subsections (a) and (b) would be in-
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the open-ended nature of Variant One is welcome. However, this option
does not recognize that national law and customary international law define
many international crimes in addition to conventional treaty law. Accord-
ingly, national courts should be able to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction
over perpetrators of human rights violations in accordance with customary
international law, national law, or pursuant to an international treaty to
which they are a party. As was noted by the Coalition, any exhaustive recita-
tion of norms "invites reservations to particular offenses, which would defeat
the purpose of prohibiting obstacles to the exercise of jurisdiction over civil
actions seeking remedy for the most serious violations. '251
National courts are capable of undertaking the systematic inquiry of in-
ternational law called for by such language. 252 For example, U.S. courts have
developed a set of standards to determine which international law norms
may be privately enforced within domestic courts. 253 According to this ju-
risprudence, in order to qualify for private enforcement within the United
States, such norms must be obligatory under all circumstances, as opposed
to merely hortatory. They must be universally applicable and the object of
concerted international attention. 2 4 Further, they must be defined with
sufficient specificity and clarity.255 The list of norms meeting these criteria is
cluded in the final text. Preliminary Document No. 11, supra note 210, at 80-81.
251. COALITION ONJURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT OFJUDGMENTS,.supra note 8, at 2.
252. Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal
Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. Rev. 463, 512 (1997) (arguing that "It)he availability of ample documents
and international legal instruments enables effective adjudication of the status of' customary interna-
tional law).
253. See, eg., In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 E3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)
("Actionable violations of international law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and obliga-
tory."); Ford v. Suarez-Mason, 672 E Supp. 1531, 1539-40 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("This 'international tort'
must be one which is definable, obligatory (rather than hortatory), and universally condemned."), amended
inpart, 694 E Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988). See generally Goodman & Jinks, supra note 252, at 493-97
(explaining the federal courts' understanding of the scope of actionable norms in domestic courts).
254. See Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 E2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The requirement that a rule com-
mand the 'general assent of civilized nations' to become binding upon them all is a stringent one."); id. at
888 ("It is only where the nations of the world have demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual, and not
merely several, concern, by means of express international accords, that a wrong generally recognized
becomes an international law violation within the meaning of the statute ATCA].").
255. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,428 (1964). The Court made clear:
that the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international
law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the courts can
then focus on the application of an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the sensi-
tive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national interest or with international
justice.
Id This is the position adopted by the executive branch of the U.S. government as well. See Filartiga
Memorandum, supra note 145, at 605. As amicus, the United States argued:
The courts are properly confined to determining whether an individual has suffered a denial of
rights guaranteed him as an individual by customary international law. Accordingly, before enter-
taining a suit alleging a violation of human rights, a court must first conclude that there is a con-
sensus in the international community that the right is protected and that there is a widely shared
understanding of the scope of this protection.
ld See also id. at 604 (arguing that the universal prohibition of torture is sufficiently defined to merit
private enforcement).
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not static. U.S. courts have recognized that contemporary international law
includes the prohibitions against genocide; 256 crimes against humanity;257
war crimes;258 slavery and forced labor;259 summary or arbitrary execu-
tions; 26° torture261 and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment;262 enforced disappearances; 263 piracy;264 and arbitrary deten-
tion.265 U.S. courts routinely decline to allow for private enforcement of in-
ternational law norms that are not sufficiently obligatory, universal, or
definable under international law. For example, U.S. courts have dismissed
256. See Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, No. 94 Civ. 3627, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4409, at *2
(S.D.N.Y Apr. 8, 1996) (civil action based on potential genocide claims in Rwanda); Kadi6 v. Karadzik,
70 E3d 232, 241-42 (2d Cir. 1995) (civil action based on crimes against humanity and possible genocide
claims in Bosnia).
257. See Kadii, 70 E3d at 236.
258. Seeid. at 242-44.
259. Se Doe v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880, 892 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (stating that participation in slave
trade, either by private individuals or under the auspices of a state, violates the law of nations); Nat'l
Coalition Gov't of Burma v. Unocal, 176 ER.D. 329, 345 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (citing the Ninth Circuit for
the proposition that slavery constitutes a violation ofjus cogens norms); United States v. Matra-Ballesteros,
71 F.3d 754, 764 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (considering the prohibition against slavery, ajus cogens norm).
260. See In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 E2d 493, 503 (9th Cir.
1992) (finding that federal subject-matter jurisdiction under § 1350 derives from a violation of a jus
cogms norm, while the cause of action derives from municipal tort law); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.
Supp. 1531, 1542 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (finding that the international legal norm prohibiting murder and
summary execution "appears to be universal, readily definable and is of course obligatory"); Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 185 (D. Mass. 1995) ("[Slummary execution... [has] been met with univer-
sal condemnation and opprobrium .... And again, not only are the proscriptions of these acts universal
and obligatory, they are adequately defined to encompass the instant allegations.") (citations omitted).
261. See Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 E2d 332, 336 (11th Cir. 1992) ("All of the authorities agree that
torture and summary execution-the torture and killing of wounded non-combatant civilians-are acts
that are viewed with universal abhorrence."); Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 E2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980)
(IMhere are few, if any, issues in international law today on which opinion seems to be so united as the
limitations on a state's power to torture persons held in its custody.") (citation omitted); In re Estate of
Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 E2d at 499 (finding the position that official torture
does not violate customary international law "unthinkable").
262. See Jama v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 22 E Supp. 2d 353, 363
(D.N.J. 1998) (finding that the "abuses which are alleged to have been inflicted upon plaintiffs violate
the international human rights norm of the right to be free from cruel, unhuman [sic] and degrading
treatment"); Xuncax, 886 E Supp. at 186 (holding that actions constituting cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment are "proscribed by the Constitution of the United States and by a cognizable
principle of international law"). This view has recently replaced a prior view that the norm against cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment lacked sufficient definition under international law to merit enforce-
ment in domestic courts. See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 712 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
263. See Forti, 694 E Supp. at 710 (finding that the prohibition against causing disappearances consti-
tutes an international tort); Xuncax, 886 E Supp. at 184-85; U.N. Declaration on the Protection of All
Perron from Enforced Disappearance, G.A. Res. 47/133, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 92d mrg., Supp. No. 49,
Article 14, at 208, U.N. Doc A/47/79 (1992); Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance
of Persons, June 9, 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1529, 1530 (1994).
264. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 E2d 774, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concur-
ring); id. at 813-14 (Bork, J., concurring).
265. See Forti, 672 E Supp. at 1541-42 (finding the norm prohibiting arbitrary detention to be
"obligatory, ... readily definable," and subject to an international consensus); Rodriguez-Fernandez v.
Wilkinson, 505 F Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), affd, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1981) (noting that
"[n]o principle of international law is more fisndamental than the concept that human beings should be
free from arbitrary imprisonment") (citations omitted); Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 184 (stating that arbi-
trary detention is a fully recognized violation of international law).
HeinOnline  -- 42 Harv. Int'l L. J. 191 2001
Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 42
causes of action for violations of free speech, 266 fraud, 267 expropriation, 268
contract offenses, 269 and corporate torts.270 This jurisprudence suggests that
national courts are capable of identifying and applying international law,
and thus are capable of interpreting an open-ended recitation of norms trig-
gering the human rights exception in the Hague Convention.
Sub-section (b) of the October Draft Convention is useful in that it pro-
vides that only those acts that constitute criminal conduct would trigger the
human rights exception. This limiting factor, as well as the inclusion of the
terms "serious," "grave," and "fundamental," ensure that the exception will
be activated only by exceptionally serious tortious conduct and will not
swallow the Hague Convention's general jurisdictional rules. Given these
thresholds, the Hague Convention's principal jurisdictional rules will con-
tinue to apply to the majority of tort cases.
Sub-section (a) of the October Draft Convention is overly restrictive inso-
far as it is limited to three international crimes and potentially defines the
acts triggering the human rights exception with reference to the definitions
of these crimes within the ICC Statute. The subject-matter jurisdiction of
the future ICC is limited to the most serious international crimes.271 As
such, the ICC Statute's definitions include high thresholds of applicability in
order to exclude smaller-scale and isolated crimes from the ICC's jurisdic-
tion.272 Precisely because the ICCs jurisdiction will be limited to criminal
prosecutions of mass violence, national courts should be empowered to assert
civil jurisdiction over lower-level human rights violations that will not meet
the thresholds of the ICC.
Finally, the Hague Convention should not require proof that proceedings
in another state are not possible. As a general rule, proof of denial of justice
is not a prerequisite to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction according
266. See Guinto v. Marcos, 654 E Supp. 276, 280 (S.D. Cal. 1986) ("[A] violation of the First
Amendment right of free speech does not rise to the level of such universally recognized rights and so
does not constitute a 'law of nations' [violation].").
267. See UiT v. Vencap, 519 112d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (declining jurisdiction over an action for
fraud, conversion, and corporate waste).
268. See Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 E2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976) (finding
no consensus on the international illegality of the forced sale of property); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 430 (1964) (finding no consensus on the illegality of expropriation and holding
that judicial deference to foreign acts is appropriate where the relevant substantive standards in interna-
tional law are unclear); Nat'l Coalition Gov't of Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 345
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (finding that a foreign sovereign's expropriation of property does not violate any univer-
sal norm under international law).
269. See Abiodun v. Martin Oil Service, Inc., 475 E2d 142, 145 (7th Cir. 1973) (affirming dismissal
on summary judgment of contract offense as not raising sufficient international law norms).
270. See Valanga v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 259 F. Supp. 324, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (finding that com-
mercial torts, such as interference with contractual relations, do not qualify for universal enforcement);
De Wit v. KIM Royal Dutch Airlines, N.V., 570 F. Supp. 613, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding no subject-
matter jurisdiction based on breach of contract and corporate tort claims).
271. See ICC Statute, supra note 99, at 3.
272. See, e.g., id. at 7 ("The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when
committed as a part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.").
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to the multilateral treaties providing for the exercise of universal criminal
jurisdiction over violations of international law. Such extraterritorial juris-
diction is distinct from international jurisdiction, which, according to a
number of multilateral treaties governing international enforcement mecha-
nisms, does require the exhaustion of local remedies. 27 3 Further, plaintiffs
should not bear the burden of trying to bring suit in various other jurisdic-
tions when the jurisdiction in which the defendant is found is available. It is
not necessary to include this sort of condition within the Hague Convention
as States Parties may decide to include such provisions in their national law.
For example, cases interpreting the TVPA in the United States require the
plaintiff to demonstrate either that domestic remedies were exhausted, or
that such exhaustion would have been futile.27 4 Indeed, as was noted by the
Coalition, "the prospect of forum-shopping by victims of human rights
abuse is remote given the steep obstacles that face most such plaintiffs in
bringing any suit at all.
In conclusion, any exception for human rights litigation should contain
the following elements. First, it must identify an exemplary, rather than
exclusive, category of norms that will trigger the exception. In this regard,
it is inappropriate for the exception to simply import the substantive norms
outlined in the ICC Statute. Rather, the exception should apply to claims for
international law violations that do not satisfy the ICC Statute's thresholds
or that do not rise to the level of crimes against humanity. Second, the ex-
ception should identify these norms such that the exception covers only ex-
tremely serious tortious conduct. Finally, the exception should not require
proof that the plaintiff has exhausted her remedies elsewhere. With all these
elements in place, the Hague Convention will ensure that victims of human
rights violations will retain their ability to seek reparations for violations of
internationally protected human rights in domestic courts in those fora in
which the perpetrator may be found.
C. The Notion of Civil Universal Jurisdiction
In the United States, the exercise of personal jurisdiction in civil cases
seeking to enforce human rights norms against individuals and entities that
are not resident in the United States has been commonly conceptualized
under domestic law as a form of doing-business jurisdiction or transient ju-
risdiction based on the notion of the transitory tort.276 This terminology is
273. See e.g., European Convention, supra note 136, art. 35(1).
274. See Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F Supp. 1189, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
275. COALITION ON JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 8, at 2.
276. Two commentators have noted that:
According to this doctrine, civil actions for personal injury torts are transitory in that the tortfea-
sor's wrongful acts create an obligation which follows him across national boundaries .... Whereas
in most foreign criminal actions extradition is the proper remedy, in civil actions it is accepted that,
'a state or nation has a legitimate interest in the orderly resolution of disputes among those within
its borders,' notwithstanding that the dispute has arisen overseas.
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well established and familiar to the common law tradition. Given the fun-
damental nature of the international law norms at issue, however, these cases
may also be conceptualized as a form of civil universal jurisdiction.
The Restatement recognizes the distinction between transitory jurisdic-
tion in the human rights context vis-a-vis other contexts. On the one hand,
it notes at § 421 that "tag jurisdiction, i.e., jurisdiction based on service of
process on one only transitorily present in the territory of the state, is not
generally acceptable under international law."277 And yet, at § 404 it ac-
knowledges that international law does not preclude the exercise of civil
universal jurisdiction in response to grave international law violations where
the action in question is necessarily related to every state: "In general, juris-
diction on the basis of universal interests has been exercised in the form of
criminal law, but international law does not preclude the application of non-
criminal law on this basis, for example, by providing a remedy in tort or
restitution for victims of piracy."278 The U.S. Congress (at the time it origi-
nally enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act),279 several commenta-
tors,280 and several U.S. courts 28 1 have all noted that the exercise of personal
Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 145, at 63 (citations omitted) (quoting Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 P.2d
876,885 (2d Cir. 1980)). See, e.g., Filartiga, 630 E2d at 885.
It is not extraordinary for a court to adjudicate a tort claim arising outside of its territorial jurisdic-
tion. A state or nation has a legitimate interest in the orderly resolution of disputes among those
within its borders, and where the lex loci delicti commissi is applied, it is an expression of comity to
give effect to the laws of the state where the wrong occurred.
Id.
277. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 10, § 421 cmt. e; see also id. § 421 rep's note
5 (stating that tag jurisdiction is unacceptable under international law if it is the only basis for jurisdic-
tion and the action in question is unrelated to that state). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAwS, § 27(a), (g) (1971) (finding acceptable jurisdiction on the basis of presence in the state or do-
ing-business in a state); id. § 28 ('A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual
who is present within its territory, whether permanently or temporarily.").
278. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 10, § 404 cmt. b.
279. See S. REP. No. 102-249, supra note 48, at 5. See also The Torture Victim Protection Act: Hearings and
Markup on H.R. 1417 Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs and its Subcomm. on Human Rights and Inter-
national Organizations, 100th Cong. 55 (1988).
280. In the opinion of a group of civil procedure and international law scholars appearing as amici in
Karadil v. Kadii, "filt is a well-established principle of international law that all States have universal
jurisdiction to provide criminal and civil redress for extraterritorial conduct that violates fundamental
norms of the law of nations, such as genocide, piracy and torture." Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Re-
spondents, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 686, 698 (1997) (submitted by Professors David J.
Bederman, Erwin Chemerinsky, William Dodge, Martha Field, Burke Marshall, Judith Resnik, David L.
Shapiro, and William W. Van Alstyne supporting a motion in opposition to a writ of certiorari); see also
The Enforcement of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law by Civil Suits in Municipal Courts: The Civil Dimen-
sion of UniversalJurisdiction, Remarks y Beth Stephens, Civil Remedies in the US Courts for International Human
Rights Abuse, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASIL/NVIR FOURTH HAGUE JOINT CONFERENCE, CONTnIMPO-
RARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES: NEW FOiS, NEw APPICATIONS 158, 162 (1997); FINAL REPORT
ON THE EXERCISE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN RESPECT OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFENSES,
supra note 112, at 3 n.6 ("In the United States universal jurisdiction has been exercised with some success
for the purpose of obtaining civil law remedies under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim
Protection Act.").
281. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 E2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Indeed, for the purposes of
civil liability, the torturer has become-like the pirate and the slave trader before him-hostis htntani
generis, an enemy of all mankind."); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir.
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jurisdiction in the context of human rights litigation in domestic courts
invokes a species of the doctrine of universal jurisdiction.
The connection between forms of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction and
suits seeking civil redress for violations of human rights norms is more sali-
ent in civil law jurisdictions where the common law distinction between
these two forms of redress is not as pronounced. Many civil law systems have
codified forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction that allow for the exercise of
transient or even more attenuated forms of jurisdiction over individuals al-
leged to have committed human rights violations abroad. In some civil law
systems, an award of civil reparations can be an integral part of a criminal
suit. Victims of human rights abuses can accordingly seek civil redress in the
context of a criminal trial that is premised upon forms of jurisdiction that
are considered exorbitant when applied within a common law framework.
This commonality among cases in common law and civil law jurisdictions
was noted by the Hague Conference Commentary on the final draft. Ac-
cording to this text,
There is a well known tendency with these international crimes to as-
sign universal jurisdiction to states to enable them to exercise criminal
jurisdiction even when there is no clear connection between the crime
and the state .... Thus it is only to be expected that criminal pro-
ceedings may be accompanied by civil proceedings instituted by vic-
tims to obtain relief from the person responsible for the violation. In
this regard, it should also be noted that a civil action of this kind may
be taken in the context of the criminal action itself if national law per-
mits this... otherwise, an action may be instituted independently in a
civil court.2 82
Given that extraterritorial jurisdiction exists over these fundamental in-
ternational norms in the criminal law context, it is perhaps no surprise that
such jurisdiction exists in the civil context as well. Imposing criminal sanc-
tions on an individual is clearly more intrusive than asserting adjudicatory
jurisdiction in a civil action, 283 which explains the heightened guarantees of
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) ("Historically these offenses held a special place in the law of nations:
their perpetrators, dubbed enemies of all mankind, were susceptible to prosecution by any nation cap-
turing them."); Kadi6 v. Karadzi6, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that "international law per-
mits states to establish appropriate civil remedies") (citation omitted); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 ESupp.
162, 182 n.25 (D. Mass. 1995) ("It is appropriate to note briefly at this point the legitimacy of United
States jurisdiction from the perspective of international law. Accordingly, I take explicit note here of the
doctrine of universal jurisdiction as set forth in Section 404 of the Restatement .... ). But see Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638 ESupp. 73, 77 (S.D.N.Y 1986), rev'd 830 E2d 421 (2d
Cir. 1987), rev'd 488 U.S. 428 (1989) (finding that universal jurisdiction does not provide jurisdiction in
a civil case).
282. Preliminary Document No. 11, supra note 210, at 80.
283. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 10, at § 403 rep's note 8
[T]he exercise of criminal (as distinguished from civil) jurisdiction in relation to acts committed in
another state may be perceived as particularly intrusive. It is generally accepted by enforcement
agencies of the United States government that criminal jurisdiction over activity with substantial
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due process accorded to the criminal defendant. The liberty of a foreign de-
fendant is at stake in criminal proceedings. In contrast, civil litigation
merely renders the foreign defendant susceptible to providing restitution or
compensation to his victims. In light of the exceptional measures authorized
by the various multilateral treaties seeking the repression of international
crimes to secure jurisdiction over alleged perpetrators in the criminal con-
text, the more passive application of universal jurisdiction in the civil con-
text should raise fewer comity concerns.284 It would be paradoxical if a vic-
tim of a human rights violation could exercise universal jurisdiction in a
criminal context, but not obtain civil redress under the same basis of juris-
diction. Further, civil suits in common law countries are "an essential sup-
plement to criminal prosecutions in those states where the criminal court
may not award reparations."285
Universal jurisdiction in the criminal context is premised on the right of
all states to punish individuals for breaches of international order,28 6 whereas
universal jurisdiction in the civil context is concerned primarily with redress
for victims. At the same time, states may adopt those mechanisms they see
fit to prevent international law violations, and authorizing private plaintiffs
to pursue civil claims can provide one such mechanism.
Accordingly, in cases seeking civil redress to enforce human rights norms,
forms of personal jurisdiction that may be considered problematic or exorbi-
tant in other contexts are, in fact, quite in tune with the jurisdictional prin-
ciples of international law. In other words, civil human rights cases premised
on otherwise exorbitant forms of jurisdiction are more analogous to criminal
cases brought under well-established forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction,
such as universal jurisdiction. Given this perspective on such litigation, pro-
tecting the ability of victims of human rights violations to bring civil cases
on the basis of otherwise prohibited bases of jurisdiction does not offend or
detract from the basic purpose of the proposed Hague Convention and is in
keeping with states' obligations under international law to respect human
rights norms and to provide victims with redress.287
foreign elements should be exercised more sparingly than civil jurisdiction over the same activity
and only upon strong justification.
Id. (citations omitted); Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 145, at 86 ("Prosecution of a foreign national for
acts committed abroad involves a much greater assumption of the foreign state's prerogatives than does
hearing a private lawsuit in which the substantive law of the situs will most likely be applied.").
284. The exercise of criminal universal jurisdiction is, to some degree, subject to approval by the ex-
ecutive branch in the United States, which will undoubtedly take foreign policy concerns into account,
However, the executive branch has expressed support for civil suits on behalf of victims of human rights
abuses. See Filartiga Memorandum, supra note 145, at 605.
285. AMNESTY INT'L, JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS: ENSURING EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT ABROAD OF
COURT DECISIONS CONCERNING REPARATIONS, supra note 8, at 8.
286. See Randall, supra note 10, at 794.
287. See Study on Reparations, supra note 82, at 58 ("12. Every State shall maintain prompt and effec-
tive disciplinary, administrative, civil and criminal procedures, with universal jurisdiction for human
rights violations that constitute crimes under international law.").
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D. Responding to Critiques
Critics may advance a number of arguments against exempting human
rights litigation from the jurisdictional prohibitions of the proposed Hague
Convention. Some of these arguments were raised during the course of the
Hague Conference debates. One concern is that the inclusion of an exception
for suits arising out of human rights abuses is that it would enable the
courts of one state to sit in judgment over citizens of another state, poten-
tially generating international tension. In extreme cases, the judiciary could
effectively deprive the executive of exclusive authority over the international
affairs of the state. This not only raises a division of powers dilemma, but
could also seriously undermine the efficacy of the state's foreign policy
making bodies.
This critique applies to the practice of universal jurisdiction more gener-
ally. First, the exercise of such forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction will not
necessarily override national law immunity or political question doctrines.288
Second, a review of the major multilateral treaties outlawing various human
rights abuses reveals that the nations of the world have almost uniformly
agreed that the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction represents an appro-
priate-and in many cases obligatory-response to the presence of human
rights abusers in state territory. Some of these multilateral conventions in-
clude advance waivers of jurisdictional defenses among signatories, as states
have agreed ex ante to either extradite or prosecute violatots. 289 As a result of
the implementation of these provisions into national laws in some states,
nations are already exercising universal jurisdiction in the criminal sphere
with increasing frequency.290
Obviously, extraterritorial forms of jurisdiction should be exercised with
restraint. Because of the dangers of judicial overreaching, it is all the more
important that the Hague Conference draft a consensus provision setting
forth the circumstances in which the exercise of civil universal jurisdiction is
appropriate and authorized. Such language would ensure that this jurisdic-
tional principle is invoked in a uniform and mutually acceptable way. With
the inclusion of such an exception, the Hague Convention will constitute
the first transnational codification of civil extraterritorial jurisdiction.
There is also the concern that if the human rights exception remains
open-ended and exemplary, it may be subject to divergent interpretations by
national courts. This is a criticism that can be leveled against the entire
Hague Convention project, as decisions engendered under the proposed
Hague Convention will not be subject to any supranational oversight
mechanism, unlike those rendered pursuant to the Brussels Convention,
288. See Working Document No. 117, supra note 8, at 6.
289. See Randall, supra note 10, at 820.
290. Sw sempra Parts ILA., II.B.l (discussing criminal prosecutions based on extraterritorial forms of
jurisdiction).
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which are subject to review before the European Court of Justice. 291 Instead,
national courts will need to independently elucidate and apply the rules of
jurisdiction set forth in the Hague Convention. Clear language and broad
political consensus will help ensure consistent downstream application in
those courts.
Likewise, the exercise of universal jurisdiction by states within the crimi-
nal context may also generate conflicting results. Nonetheless, the hope for
the entire Hague Convention effort is that a species of transnational prece-
dent will develop over time, so that national courts will look to the juris-
prudence of other signatory states in interpreting the human rights excep-
tion, and indeed all the Hague Convention's provisions.2 92
In a related vein, there is the concern that the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction---either criminal or civil-will result in patchwork justice that
reaches only those abusers who travel abroad. 293 But the fact that not all
abusers will subject themselves to extraterritorial jurisdiction by leaving safe
haven states should not bar victims from utilizing those forms of jurisdic-
tion when they are available. The eventual goal is a comprehensive system of
justice for victims on the national and international levels, so that every per-
petrator is brought to justice. Civil universal jurisdiction provides another
layer of that expanding system of justice for human rights victims.
It has also been argued that justice for human rights abusers is better
found at home, allowing nations to "consolidate memories and 'engage in
secular rituals of commemoration.' 294 In an ideal world, individuals accused
of committing grave human rights violations would be tried-either crimi-
nally or civilly-in the states in which they committed their crimes. This is
true not only for practical reasons, as it is likely that any evidence of the
crimes is available only in the state in which the violations occurred, but
also for more symbolic or emotive reasons. Citizens of these countries need
to see human rights abusers brought to justice in order to come to terms
with their country's history of violence, to counter revisionist accounts de-
nying the existence of repression, and to provide a local forum in which vic-
tims may bear witness. However, when such countries are unwilling or un-
able to commence proceedings, or when the victims have resettled abroad,
other states must be able to allow suits to proceed in their courts in order to
ensure that universal international norms are effectively enforced. Moreover,
291. See Protocol Concerning the Interpretation by the Court of'Justice of the Convention of 27 Sep-
tember 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 1,
1975 O.J. (L 204) 28, 29.
292. See Aceves, supra note 27, at 179 (observing that "[t]he development of interstate agreements
that facilitate collaboration in civil and criminal matters would further reduce potential conflicts [be-
tween national rulings)").
293. See David Bosco, Dictators in the Dock, AM. PROSPEcT, Aug. 14, 2000, at 29 (discussing criti-
cisms of extrateritorial jurisdiction).
294. MINOW, supra note 86, at 46, citing MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCrrY, COLLEcrmVE MEMORY, AND
THE LAw 463 (1997).
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such international actions do not preclude related trials in home states when
and if they become politically viable.
VI. CONCLUSION
Absent an exception for human rights litigation, the jurisdictional regime
of the proposed Hague Convention threatens to jeopardize efforts by states
and individuals to enforce international human rights norms through crimi-
nal and civil actions seeking civil redress in national courts. This threat is
especially alarming given the scarcity of international and regional fora
available to individual victims of human rights abuses. It is thus crucial that
the proposed Hague Convention include some exceptional language taking
into account the considerations discussed above to protect the ability of vic-
tims of human rights abuses to bring suit against their tormenters wherever
the latter may be found. This will ensure that victims who lack access to the
courts of the state in which their harm occurred are not denied legal redress
and that perpetrators, who are immune from suit in their home countries,
can be held accountable for their violations of international law wherever
they can be found. Further, this will ensure that the proposed Hague Con-
vention does not hinder states' efforts to fulfill multilateral obligations to
prevent, punish, or remedy international law violations.
In this way, the Hague Convention will reflect the fact that human rights
litigation is qualitatively different from traditional contract, commercial, or
tort litigation. 29" The Hague Convention should privilege civil actions to
enforce international human rights, international criminal law, and humani-
tarian law precisely because the standards these norms seek to vindicate are
universal, and their violation and remedy is of concern to the entire interna-
tional community. The special quality of this category of international of-
fenses gives each state the right to extend its jurisdiction over violators, even
if the offender has no special connection to the state. If national courts de-
cline to entertain meritorious claims brought to enforce human rights
norms, or decline to enforce judgments resulting from such civil suits, they
risk contravening both treaty and customary international law obligations.
Given the special quality of these norms, it is inappropriate to subject vastly
different types of cases to a uniform set of jurisdictional rules that fails to
take into account these disparities. The revisions suggested above acknowl-
edge the fact that the Hague Convention will primarily address commercial
disputes, but at the same time they ensure that the Hague Convention does
not inadvertently foreclose the ability of victims of human rights abuses to
seek civil redress in domestic courts.
International human rights law is composed of a core group of norms that
is fundamental to our communal sense of fairness and justice. If these norms
295. Sw Amley, supra note 168, at 2195-97 (noting the political symbolism and social ramifications
of human rights suits versus transnational commercial tort and contractual disputes).
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are to be meaningful, however, the nations of the world must enforce them
and provide comprehensive redress to victims. Civil suits in domestic courts
play a crucial role in this process. A judgment denouncing a human rights
violation, identifying a responsible individual, and providing reparations can
go a long way toward restoring a victim's sense of justice. Further, an en-
forceable damage award can assist the rehabilitation of victims of human
rights abuses who must restart their lives in their countries of refuge. Unless
wrongful conduct is addressed in some official and public capacity, violations
will be repeated with impunity. For these reasons, it is imperative that the
proposed Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters enables-rather than disables-suits seeking civil re-
dress for grave human rights violations and, in so doing, contributes to the
enforcement of human rights norms worldwide.
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